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This thesis seeks to analyze the international community‟s conflict management 
capabilities through its response to the Darfur crisis.  Primarily, it aims to show through the lens 
of the Darfur crisis, which is widely accepted as the first genocide of the twenty-first century, 
that the international community has yet to develop a framework to collectively intervene in and 
resolve crimes against humanity.  Additionally, this thesis will show the international 
community‟s recognition of their shortcomings through the gradual transformation of policies 
undertaken by several of its leading entities in response to the crisis.  The research will pinpoint 
several major factors behind the lack of a unified global community acting in Darfur, such as 
geopolitical fragility between major international organizations, fragmentation caused by wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the global War on Terror which occurred concurrently with the 
genocide in Darfur, and the underlying political and economic alliances that many major 
countries including the United States and China, enjoy with the Government of Sudan. 
The work will focus specifically on the United States, the United Nations, the European 
Union, and the African Union, analyzing the actions of each respective group in facilitating an 
end to the Darfur conflict. Ultimately, this thesis will use the research to conclude that the 
international community was willing to accept the Darfur genocide, with its death toll nearing 
four-hundred thousand and well over two million internally displaced peoples, in order to 
advance their respective global interests and preserve the status quo of global affairs in the early 
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 Within the first three years of the new millennium, a major conflict erupted from an 
already volatile situation in Western Sudan, and the world was about to become witness to the 
first potential genocide of the twenty-first century.  Since European colonization, the relationship 
between the Arab and African inhabitants of Darfur, a vast and arid region of Western Sudan, 
has been an unstable one.  Institutionalized racism and cultural prejudices were ever-present 
amongst many other factors responsible for the volatility. In spite of the frailty, relations between 
sedentary Africans and nomadic Arabs were somewhat manageable; this changed after 1984.  
The encroaching Sahara rapidly deteriorated the troubled relationship of Africans and Arabs in 
Darfur, transforming it over the span of two decades, from one of uneasy truce, to one of violent 
conflict. 
 The historical dichotomy of the Darfur region between mostly settled African farmers 
and their nomadic Arab counterparts quickly dissolved as a result of desertification.  Darfuri 
rebel groups pushing for more recognition and less marginalization began mobilizing and 
confronting government garrisons in Northern Darfur in 2002. The rebel movement in Darfur 
grew in strength and momentum, scoring a number of resounding victories against a surprised 
and beleaguered Sudanese army.  Instead of negotiations, this prompted the Sudanese 
government to sponsor a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur, with the ultimate aim of 
removing or eliminating all ethnic African elements in the region and replacing them with ethnic 
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groups that identified themselves as Arab in culture and lineage.
1
 To accomplish this aim, the 
Sudanese regime under Omar al-Bashir utilized a number of alarming tactics. The occasional use 
of conventional military troops and equipment including rocket propelled grenades and 
helicopter gunships, took a devastating toll on Darfur and its native inhabitants.
2
 Non-
government militiamen, known as Janjawid, were used as ground forces by the government and 
did indeed live up to the meaning of their moniker, devil on horseback, with disturbing success. 
 The mission given to the Janjawid and their strategy was very simple; destroy everything 
and scorch the earth rendering the area inhospitable.
3
 Villages were surrounded and brutally 
destroyed. All livestock were rounded up and killed. Wells were poisoned with the bodies of 
decaying animals. Buildings, particularly those important to culture and politics, were burned.  
Women and young girls were repeatedly raped and mutilated. Men and young boys were 
rounded up and summarily executed by generally low-tech methods such as shooting, stabbing, 
clubbing, or decapitation. Children were thrown into burning buildings, or chained to them. 
Tortures and disappearances were common place.  The Janjawid carried out their mission with 
ruthless efficiency; through this process more rebels were created, “justifying” Khartoum‟s 
actions. 
 This precarious development did not happen within the vacuum of desertification 
however. To fully understand the origins of the conflict, we would need to become well-versed 
in the history and ethnography of Darfur, Sudan, and East Africa on a whole.  There are several 
                                                            
 
1 Gerard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, 3rd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 152. 
2 M.W. Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
282-3.  
3 Ibid., 278. 
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factors that are widely accepted as key in triggering the events that led to the crisis. One such 
factor is the racial classification system introduced by colonial British administrators which 
effectively marginalized the native population of sedentary Africans and installed Arab nobles as 
governors of the region. Regarding the racial classification system, there are two important 
distinctions that should be noted. First, in terms of skin color, everyone is black. A dark-skinned 
large-featured livestock herder could be considered “Arab” and a fair-skinned thin featured 
farmer could be considered “African.”
4
 The ambiguity of racial classification is more based on 
the way of life.  Second, not all African ethnic groups in Sudan subscribe to the rebel cause and 
some were in fact aligned with the government. Likewise, some of the strongest and most 
influential Arab ethnic groups were not involved with the conflict and some were even quiet 
allies of the Darfuri rebels.
5
  
 Another crucial factor was the pro-Arab Sudanese government based in Khartoum. This 
government, under the leadership of Omar al-Bashir has been in de facto power since 1965 and 
continued a policy of neglecting Darfur, building little infrastructure and investing virtually no 
aid in the region.  Although full comprehension of the origins of the Darfur crisis would prove 
helpful in understanding the fractured intervention process that followed, the amount of research 
and attention required to complete this task satisfactorily is out of the realm of this thesis and the 
scope of its requirements. This work will instead focus primarily on the international 
community‟s attempted facilitation of a suitable peace in Darfur. 
                                                            
 
4 Prunier, 5. 




 The historical trend of international intervention has been vibrant. With its official origins 
in the Nuremburg Tribunal of 1945, the interventionalist argument gained significant momentum 
as a result of two World Wars, both of which bore witness to grand scale systematic murder in 
the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust.  The assimilation of crimes against humanity 
into international law at the Nuremburg Tribunal was followed by the successes of the Genocide 
Convention of 1948. The ratification of this law, which legally defined the crime of genocide and 
advised participating countries to intercede in the most extreme cases of crimes against 




Motivated by past horrors of genocide and crimes against humanity, and legitimized by 
the United Nations signing into effect Genocide Resolution 260, it appeared as if the global 
community, on the back of two World Wars and boosted by great scientific and technological 
advancement, would be proactive in preventing large-scale atrocities and war crimes from taking 
place.  However since its advent, the international community has only found two incidents to be 
in breach of the law; Rwanda and Yugoslavia.
7
 Universally accepted incidents that certainly 
violated the parameters of Resolution 260, like the Khmer Rouge‟s massacre of Cambodians or 
Saddam Hussein‟s near annihilation of the Kurds in Northern Iraq have either been overlooked, 
under-examined, or acted upon too late. Yet another great violation of human rights which has 
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undoubtedly caught the attention of the world media, intellectuals, and the international 
community and entered the genocide debate is the Darfur Crisis. 
For many countries, events in Darfur erupted at the most inopportune time.  Most 
developed countries, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, were heavily invested in 
the Global War on Terror. Internationally, the economic situation was fragile due to the global 
recession of 2001-2002; economic forecasts for the remainder of the decade did not boost 
confidences.
8
 Complications and outright failures in certain facets of the handling of the 
Rwandan and Bosnian Genocides left a bitter taste in the mouths of policymakers responsible for 
the facilitation of their resolutions.  Nonetheless, to blame the international community‟s failures 
in Darfur primarily on other international conflicts and bad economic forecasts would be a 
fallacy. These aspects certainly had an adverse influence on the Darfur intervention effort, yet 
other more realpolitik-based factors hold equal or even greater importance.  
If we approach the Darfur intervention effort from the perspective of separate countries 
or organizations, such as the United Nations or African Union, we will better understand how 
political ideology, economics, and to an understated degree, race played a negative role in the 
process.  The international community‟s intervention effort in Darfur was not monolithic or 
unified.  Key global interests, like those previously mentioned, of individual states acting 
independently or within the structure of international organizations such as the United Nations, 
created a significant divide on how to move forward on the Darfur question.  This thesis will 
attempt to identify these and other factors, analyze them, and place them within the context of 
                                                            
 
8 Robert Gilpin, “The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century,” in Globalization and 
the Poor: Exploitation or Equalizer?, ed. William Driscoll and Julie Clark (New York: The International Debate 
Education Association, 2003), 63-5.   
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genocide studies from an international intervention perspective. Ultimately, this work will show, 
through the analysis of the international community‟s experience in Darfur, that despite the 
attempts of the Genocide Convention and the Responsibility to Protect norm, the international 
community has yet to develop a framework through which to adequately respond to genocides.   
In the specific case of Darfur, this work will show that the global community was unable 
to arrive at a unified response due to the national goals and self-interests of its members. These 
interests outweighed the interests of organizations such as the UN, and helped to portray an 
international community composed of states which were unwilling to sacrifice the geopolitical 
status quo and risk the global political fragmentation that may have arisen were they to pressure 
Khartoum and its backers, thereby addressing the problem.   
The importance of this work is twofold.  There is a limited but burgeoning amount of 
historiographic analysis on the Darfur genocide due to the modernity of the topic.  Previous 
publications have tended to focus more on the humanitarian aspect of the failed intervention 
effort in Darfur and less on the political complexities that shape the dilemma.  This is likely due 
to the emotional tensions that surface in the literature as a result of the recentness of the topic. 
This work utilizes many of the same sources identified by previous scholars, but recognizes the 
political aspect as most paramount, and analyzes the respective policies of each international 
entity discussed herein, from that perspective.  Political unity, in essence, begets successful 
humanitarianism in regards to global humanitarian crises. Likewise, this thesis seeks to add to 
the developing literature concerning the international response to the genocide by 
contextualizing the failed international response as a trend in all humanitarian crises.  
Recognized failure for the international community has been a realization not only for the 
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ongoing Darfur crisis, which to date has not been fully resolved, but also the drawn out 
genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia a decade before, and possibly any future crises that may occur 
until a verifiable international response structure is configured.   
In addition to the introduction, this thesis contains four chapters and a conclusion section.  
The first chapter, entitled “The United States: the Struggle between Rhetoric and Action” 
examines the United States pervasive role in the international community‟s irresolute response to 
the Darfur question. It ponders the effects an election year and involvement in two international 
wars had on the American effort and posits that the US was forced, for a number of reasons, into 
responding to the crisis that it originally intended to avoid.  The second chapter, “The United 
Nations: No Shoulders to Bear the Blame” depicts a United Nations waning in power and 
influence that feared the international community would make it solely responsible for resolving 
the crisis without giving it the tools to do so.  As a result, the United Nations actions were 
dictated by a number of its member states as well as the Sudanese government, impeding it from 
developing a strong approach to the matter.   
The third chapter is titled, “The European Union and Darfur: the transition from 
Apathetic Benefaction to Peripheral Engagement” and analyzes the transformation of the EU‟s 
response from its beginnings as a passive source of humanitarian aid, to its later efforts which 
saw it mobilize troops whose goal was to contain, but not resolve the crisis which was 
threatening to spread into neighboring East African nations. The final chapter, “The African 
Union: an Impossible Task on a Shoestring Budget” explores the young organization‟s 
mishandling of the Darfur genocide, which was the Union‟s first major test and had 
repercussions on its primary aim of becoming a global leader.  The section looks at the effect 
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underfunding, a poorly planned operation, and a political split within the organization based on 
ethnicity had on the success, or lack thereof, of the African Union‟s Mission in Sudan.  Finally, 
the conclusion provides a synopsis of the arguments and seeks to connect the main points of the 
thesis to recent genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, and to a greater extent, the historiography of 
genocide. 
Within this introduction, it is important to analyze genocide theory and why I believe, 
based on the principal concepts of genocide studies, the situation in Darfur from 2003 to 2008 
constitutes the use of such heavy terminology.  Alain Destexhe, in his important work on the 
three quintessential genocides of the twentieth century, identifies several connecting factors 
within all three genocides that were also present in Darfur, helping to confirm my perception.  In 
his study, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Destexhe rigidly defines genocide by 
defining first what genocide is and is not, and second, how genocide is allowed to occur.  He 
states that the word “genocide” has lost its meaning due to verbal inflation; the overuse of the 
word to describe events that have little or nothing in common with the actual meaning. In such, 
there is a distortion of the importance of the word, evident in the use of it in the media to 
describe natural disasters, or worse yet, financial meltdowns.
9
 He explains that disasters and 
events that cost many lives, such as the bombing of Hiroshima, must be distinguished from 
genocides because they lack a deliberate policy of intent to eliminate a specific group.  Acts of 
extreme barbarism likewise cannot be defined as genocide because such acts are engrossed in 
emotion and are generally spontaneous, which cannot be compared with the cold-blooded 
                                                            
 
9 Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (London: Pluto Press, 1995), 9-13. 
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planning and calculation involved in implementing genocide; barbarism absolves responsibility 
while genocide bestows collective guilt.
10
 
Destexhe‟s description of the meaning of genocide centers around one key aspect, intent.  
Genocide, according to the author, is the destruction of a nation or ethnic group with the 
existence of a coordinated plan, aimed at total annihilation.
11
 Genocide is not a war crime; 
however it is hidden within war and is a crime against the rules of war and against humanity 
itself.  Genocide is a crime against humanity in the same sense that a homicide is a crime against 
the individual; both are denied the natural right to exist by the perpetrator. Genocide should be 
distinguished from mass murder however, because mass murder generally does not account for 
motive and preparation and places too much emphasis on numbers involved (the intent to 
completely destroy a specific group is indeed the crime). Whether for expansionist aims, political 
and economic motivations, or cultural differences, according to Destexhe, the unique 
determinant of genocide is motive.   
There are several features, according to Destexhe and other scholars on genocide study 
including Richard G. Hovannisian, that have been pinpointed as similarities amongst all cases of 
successful genocide in the modern era. In every instance, the perpetrators conduct genocide 
under the cover of major international conflicts, diverting international attention thereby 
minimizing the possibility for intervention. There is also the existence in each case of an 
ideology instilled by the perpetrating government that is based on racism, xenophobia, and 
intolerance that propagates the idea that the victim group is unworthy of assimilation or 
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existence.  Another similarity is the vulnerability of the targeted group to paramilitary forces 
backed by the government.  Other similarities include the promotion of looting and confiscation 
of the victim group‟s lands by other groups, the vehement denial of any wrong doing by the 
perpetrating government, and extreme punishments for individuals sympathetic to the plight of 
the victim group.
12
 Genocides in the modern era typically followed this pattern and were 
successfully implemented through the use of these tactics.        
Many authors, most notably Mahmood Mamdani, would argue that the situation in Darfur 
does not represent genocide because there is a recognizable resistance or insurgency, the Arab 
assailants are mostly paramilitary, and because the entire Arab population of Sudan does not 
support its government‟s action nor is the entire black population of Sudan attacked.  This view 
deliberately overlooks intent, which as previously mentioned, is the main qualifying component 
of genocide.  Nomadic Arab settlement of Western Sudan, which is the ancestral homeland of a 
number of indigenous African peoples, has led to a long lasting conflict. The conflict shifted in 
2003 when the Arab-dominant Sudanese government under Omar al-Bashir adopted a policy of a 
deliberate and premeditated destruction of black African ethnic groups in Darfur, with intent to 
afterward populate the land with Arab settlers (to use the region as grazing land for their herds) 
and thus create a near homogeneous state in the region.  This would in turn eliminate resistance 
to the government, which at the time emanated from Darfur, and would strengthen Arab 
hegemony over the region. 
                                                            
 
12 Richard G. Hovannisian, “Historical Dimensions, 1878-1923” in The Armenian Genocide in Perspective, ed. 
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    Despite detractors, the Darfur crisis fits concisely with Destexhe‟s definition of 
genocide.  It is a theorized and studied campaign implemented by the Government of Sudan to 
eliminate an entire racial group from their ancestral homeland.  It is also centrally planned, 
indicative of the involvement of high ranking government officials, including al-Bashir. 
Although the entire population does not support the operation, a majority of the government is 
behind the process.  The first-hand slaughter and removal of the targeted group is carried out by 
paramilitary organizations, the Janjawid, that are unquestionably loyal to the cause and are 
organized, trained, and closely monitored by the Sudanese government and supported by the 
regular Army.  The sole purpose of the Janjawid is to act as a catalyst for destruction of African 
groups in Darfur by burning villages, kidnapping and murdering important political and cultural 
leaders, and killing men or raping women in order to separate families so that reproduction is 
curtailed.  For these reasons, the conflict in Darfur will be rightly referred to as genocide within 
this work.         
There have been many global actors in the Darfur intervention effort, ranging from 
nations that have had a minimal impact on the process to those that have been primary actors in 
the implementation of policy or the financing and distribution of humanitarian aid.  For the 
purpose of this study however, we will focus on nations and multinational organizations that are 
traditionally active in the geopolitical paradigm and have been overtly involved in events that 
have shaped the policies and decision-making processes that surround the crisis resolution effort. 
As previously noted, I have identified four leading international entities that had a direct 
influence on the genocide in Darfur and its attempted resolution: the United States, the United 
Nations, the European Union, and the African Union. Other states, such as China and Russia, as 
12 
 
well as organizations like the Arab League had noteworthy influence in the Darfur intervention 
process and the effect of their exploits will be discussed within the chapter analyzing the United 
Nation, given their status as powerful member states of the organization.  NATO, with many of 
its members already members of the European Union and with a similar Darfur strategy as that 
of the EU, will not require major discussion within this work.
13
 The roles of multinational 
organizations and non-governmental organizations will be discussed, but only within the context 
of their political and economic influence on the aforementioned key states.  
 Although a secondary concern during both Bush Administrations, the Darfur genocide 
presented many problems for US primary concerns such as American foreign policy and global 
economic hegemony, and therefore posed a challenge for its leaders. On one side, realists within 
the US Government, notably the US Department of State and the CIA amongst others, believed 
that Sudan and the Khartoum regime under Al-Bashir was too important strategically to upset or 
alienate; thus they felt that American intervention would prove detrimental to US geopolitical 
aims.  On the other side, human rights groups, the Christian and Jewish communities, NGO‟s, 
and large elements within Congress judged US intervention in Darfur the only viable option in 
bringing an end to the human rights abuses suffered by its people.
14
 The Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) of 2006 was another source of contention for the United States.  Meant to bring about a 
lasting peace in the region, the DPA sparked fighting within the rebel movement as its largest 
faction and only faction supported by the US, the Sudan Liberation Movement, was the only 
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rebel group present to sign the agreement.
15
 Factions that opposed the accord because their 
concerns were not addressed were marginalized by the US much like they had been marginalized 
by Khartoum.        
 In a critical examination of the United States interventionist response to the Darfur 
genocide, Steven Fake and Kevin Funk illustrate a United States that was well aware of Sudan‟s 
crucial position within Africa for US foreign policy. Sudan under the Bashir regime, according to 
the authors, had been a significant ally in intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism in the War 
on Terror. It was also one of few African nations fully committed to neoliberal economic reform, 
in the mold of Western Nations.  Most importantly, it was a producer and supplier of crucial 
natural resources, notably oil.
16
  
Global competition for Sudanese oil, particularly from China, had forced the United 
States to reconsider its policy and interests in the region. Whereas in other African nations and 
weaker nations in general, the United States had successfully linked human rights and security to 
economics in an effort to strengthen its regional interests, Sudan was a main focus of China, a 
distinct rival to the United States and one that generally avoids linking human rights and other 
interests to economics, making them a more attractive trading partner to developing nations or 
regimes.   
The discovery of oil reserves in Darfur during the conflict added yet another dimension to 
the already intricate dilemma faced by American foreign policy analysts. On one hand, oil 
exploration and discovery in the region had the potential to bring infrastructure investment, jobs, 
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and overall development to Darfur. On the other, it had the potential to escalate instability and 
damage relations between rebel factions and the government further as the possibility of oil 
revenue inevitably raised the stakes.
17
 US foreign policymakers were thus faced with the 
question of whether or not the pre-meditated destruction of African ethnic groups in Darfur 
conflicted with the overall national interests of the United States. 
The difficulties faced by the United States in its stance towards intervention in the Darfur 
genocide undoubtedly affected the United Nations.  In Darfur, the UN faced a conundrum unique 
in its complexity and depth, and hoped for a pragmatic and unified solution to emerge from its 
members‟ dialogue. Member nations of the international organization, including every member 
of the Security Council, were instead at odds on how to approach the delicate situation. 
Recognizing Darfur as one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent times, as well as one of the 
most violent, the UN under the leadership of Secretary General Kofi Annan, implored its 
members, particularly the Security Council, to aid the organization in its peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions in the region.  The United Nations, which traditionally relies almost 
totally on manpower and funding from its member states, was totally at the behest of them.  
Highlighting the atrocities of Rwanda, Kofi Annan and other UN officials attempted to raise a 
link between the international responsibility to protect and the countless human rights violations 
that were crippling Darfur.
18
   
Although intentionally avoiding the use of the word “genocide” in their terminology, UN 
officials beseeched its members not to sit idly and allow the crisis to spread out of Darfur into the 
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rest of East and Central Africa; they did not.  UN member states, led by the Security Council, 
demanded that the United Nations intervene in Darfur.  They did this however, without 
supplying adequate manpower, funding, or sanctions.  The fear some states had of agitating 
Sudan, with its political and economic importance, turned small and large UN members away 
from direct engagement.  Even still, western nations like the United States were making it 
difficult for the UN to establish any ground in facilitating justice in Darfur out of fear that a 
global organization with the power to try and convict state leaders threatened their national 
sovereignty.  China and Russia blocked economic sanctions and “no-fly zones” by threatening to 
use their veto power while simultaneously supplying weaponry to both sides.  Over the span of 
the conflict, it became perfectly clear to the United Nations that its members were more 
interested in their respective national interests than in intervening in the genocide, stifling the 
organization tremendously.  
Self-admittedly bearing some responsibility for the current state of affairs in much of 
Africa, European nations have aided in the continent‟s recovery through the development of 
infrastructure projects and humanitarian programs. In Darfur, European states collectively voiced 
by the European Union, continued their policy of humanitarianism and funding. This, despite the 
glaringly obvious need for manpower which was evidenced by aid shipments being blocked from 
entering Sudan or disappearing within, and by the apathetic responses emanating from Khartoum 
regarding these occurrences.   
Mobilization of funds had also been accompanied by numerous condemnations of 
Khartoum‟s methods in Darfur, as well as action plans to end human rights violations there. 
From 2006 to 2008, the European Union and Common Foreign and Security Policy Chief Javier 
16 
 
Solana officially condemned Khartoum‟s handling of the situation in Darfur over fifteen times.
19
 
The European Union also voiced the need for a peacekeeping force in the region. However, prior 
to 2008 they were unwilling to provide troops under the name of the European Union and instead 
supported the initiative of a hybrid United Nations/African Union force with funding and little 
else.  In January 2008, the European Union took the decision to launch a peacekeeping mission 
in Central and Eastern Africa, primarily deployed to Chad, to stabilize and contain war zones and 
to aid refugees.
20
 Before 2008, the European Union supported measures for “no-fly zones” and 
economic sanctions, but like others in the global community, when the Sudanese government 
promptly violated the measures, the EU did little or nothing to enforce them.
21
 Khartoum was 
also bullish in their insistence that no force comprised solely of Western troops would be 
allowed to intervene in Darfur, citing their belief that humanitarian intervention would lead to an 
invasion.
22
 Hampered by Khartoum‟s ability to keep Darfur out of the military reach of the 
international community and its own lack of direction and coordination, the European Union‟s 
actions during the first five years of the Darfur genocide were purely humanitarian.
23
  
The January 2008 policy change which saw 3700 European Force (EUFOR) troops 
deployed to Chad marked a significant shift in the European Union‟s Darfur strategy.  The EU 
seemed to have recognized after five years that humanitarian intervention in the form of money 
would not be productive without a military operation to supplement its implementation, and thus 
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shed its policy of disengagement. The force also represented the resolve and determination of the 
European Union to not allow the conflict in Darfur to spill out into surrounding East and Central 
Africa, destabilizing European-backed African governments and potentially causing a security 
meltdown in the region.   
The recentness of this change in policy has occurred after notable Darfur scholars, such 
as Gerard Prunier, wrote their most current pieces on the subject.  There is therefore a lack of 
historiographic analysis on the influence of the introduction of European troops to the region. 
However, Mahmood Mamdani in Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror 
claims that the European Union, notably France, supported and provided the majority of troops 
to EUFOR with the intent of protecting their continental investment and to militarize the 
Chadian/Sudan border to provide cover to Darfuri rebels as they recruit from refugee camps in 
Chad.
24
  He further questions the European Union‟s motives in Darfur, asking whether the force 
is meant to stabilize the region, or is it an introductory force meant to prepare for a cross-border 
military intervention into Darfur.   
The last international organization examined within this work is the African Union. In 
Darfur, the African Union saw an opportunity to legitimize itself in the eyes of the global 
community as their actions in the region would be heavily scrutinized by the global community.  
This is a result of the fledgling organization‟s almost sole dependence on international donors to 
sponsor the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).
25
 More than happy to finance AMIS in 
order to keep their collective hands clean, the EU, US, and UN donated nearly $250 million to 
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the AU.  However, the global effort to leave “African problems to African solutions” only 
worked well in theory, not in practice.  In terms of personnel and materiel, the African Union 
was severely lacking.  It took them several months to find, train, and equip the 3,500 troops that 
Khartoum agreed to allow into Darfur. Aircraft and ground vehicles, barracks, and funds to pay 
and train the soldiers which were promised in abundance by the international community, 
trickled in once AMIS ran into difficulties.
26
 Tactically, the mission was at a precipice because 
its leaders did not know how to approach the delicate racial balance in Darfur; they feared their 
actions would lead to a potential split within the AU between Arabs and Black Africans.
27
 
Mamdani posits that the AU was deliberately politically undermined by Western nations.  
He states that Western donors did not uphold their agreement to provide necessary funds and 
equipment in an effort to discredit the AU in the region, clearing the way for a UN force to 
intervene in Darfur.
28
 This United Nations force, states the author, would ironically be manned 
with African soldiers, effectively replacing African Union green hats with UN blue hats.
29
 The 
view that the international community hobbled the AU in its actions in Darfur is somewhat 
shared by Prunier, though with more agency being placed on the African Union.  He charges that 
the AU was a willing victim because though AMIS was in disarray, the international community 
legitimized the organization by allowing it to be the sole decision maker in Darfur.
30
 He states 
that the African Union could claim no responsibility for the AMIS disaster as they could blame 
donors for not following through with promises.  
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        In all, the lack of urgency and intentional ambiguity displayed by these nations and 
organizations pertaining to the Darfur genocide was paramount in their inability to resolve it. 
From the analysis of their respective policies and actions in the region, I will show that the 
international community both as separate states and en masse, dithered over Darfur for multiple 
individualistic reasons, but most important, because they collectively feared that intervention in 
the region would significantly alter the global status quo, which was a risk that they were not 
willing to take; not even at the cost of over three million effected lives. 
20 
 
CHAPTER ONE: THE UNITED STATES- THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN 
RHETORIC AND ACTION 
 
 The progression of the American response and subsequent handling of the Darfur 
genocide by the United States under the Bush Administration can be characterized by stagnation. 
Between 2003 and 2008, the typically aggressive Bush Administration could not find a suitable 
answer to the Darfur question. Intense media attention and pressure from NGOs, Jewish and 
evangelical religious institutions, and powerful members of congress forced into the limelight a 
complex problem that the Washington, under President Bush, wanted to put on the backburner.
1
  
Totally engaged in the War on Terror and facing growing tensions with the People‟s Republic of 
China over global hegemony, policymakers within the Administration devoted little time and 
strategy to addressing the volatile conditions in Western Sudan.      
On September 9, 2004, with the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking at a 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the United States position on the 
situation in Darfur significantly worsened:   
And, Mr. Chairman, there is, finally, the continuing question of whether what is 
happening in Darfur should be called genocide. 
Since the United States became aware of atrocities occurring in Sudan, we have 
been reviewing the Genocide Convention and the obligations it places on the Government 
of Sudan and on the international community and on the state parties to the genocide 
convention… 
…When we reviewed the evidence compiled by our team, and then put it beside 
other information available to the State Department and widely known throughout the 
international community, widely reported upon by the media and by others, we 
concluded, I concluded, that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the 
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Secretary of State Powell‟s allegations that the Government of Sudan was committing genocide 
in Darfur in 2004, was swiftly followed by a caveat that the United States had “no vital interests” 
in the region, thus meaning the US would not be intervening militarily.
3
 There are several 
nuances within Secretary of State Powell‟s speech, notably his labeling of the situation in Darfur 
“genocide” and the subsequent assurance that military action would not be pursued, which must 
be addressed.  Steven Fake and Kevin Funk assert that, “the US readily declares “genocide” 
when the violence is perpetrated by approved enemies or is otherwise found to be politically 
useful, while silence prevails if the mass murder is conducted by allies.”
4
 The crux of this claim 
lies in the authors‟ beliefs that, deduced from Powell‟s testimony, the United States feared 
affecting the global status quo, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, where its geopolitical 
interests were at the time most focused. 
The aforementioned War on Terror was a significant cause of inactivity in terms of 
American strategy for Darfur. David Morse highlights that the Bush Administration viewed the 
Government of Sudan as a prime ally in the war on terror and had been developing a relationship 
with the Khartoum regime based on the latter‟s sharing of anti-terrorism intelligence.
5
 Likewise, 
a burgeoning relationship with Khartoum was being pursued by the United States for oil.  Energy 
security, noted by policymakers in the government, was to be a paramount topic of debate and 
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action over the next century with American, Russian, and Chinese eyes, amongst many others, 
affixed on the African continent.
6
 African energy, in the form of oil, became a main focus for US 
grand strategy in the early years of the millennium.   
The importance of African oil for US foreign policy is dual. It allows the US to diversify 
its oil sources away from the Persian Gulf, Venezuela, and other states that are considered 
enemies to US goals, and once controlled allows the US to deter the much sought after African 
oil market away from competitors like China.
7
  The Bush Administration prior to 2005 focused 
its oil diversity programs in Africa on six countries: Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Chad, and Equatorial Guinea.
8
 After 2005 and a major oil discovery in Darfur that potentially 
doubled Sudan‟s already 400,000 barrel a day output, Washington‟s dormant oil interest in 
Sudan, which began before the new millennium, became active.
9
 With the introduction of Sudan 
as a potential oil partner, the War on Terror, and its main foreign policy aim of maintaining US 
dominance on the global scene, strongly pursuing the Darfur genocide was not a viable option 
for the Bush Administration; in this instance, national interests and sovereignty outweighed 
international humanitarianism.  In essence, the Bush Administration in the most pivotal period of 
American policymaking towards the Darfur genocide, from mid-2004 to mid-2005, knowingly 
spread itself uselessly thin in an effort to appease constituents domestically (in an election year), 
as well as NGO‟s and the intelligence community which had disparate opinions on how the US 
should handle Darfur and Khartoum itself. 
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As the dominant global political issue of our time, the War on Terror took precedence 
over all other international paradigms, including Darfur, for US policymakers.  Constantly 
searching for allies and intelligence on how to contend with and neutralize an enemy that spans 
across the globe, the United States began a process of rapprochement with the Government of 




 Sudan had been a renowned sponsor of terrorism and official 
enemy of the United States since the early 1990s; Sudan was put on the US State Department‟s 
list of states that sponsor terrorism in 1993 and has been sanctioned by the US since 1997.
11
 The 
stark change in relations came as a result of Sudan being forced into mediation with the United 
States, which threatened military action if Sudan did not cooperate.   
The consequences of this relationship were fruitful in terms of advancing American 
interests in East Africa and the Middle East.  Counter-terrorism intelligence had been readily and 
ably supplied to the CIA and other American intelligence agencies by the Mukhabarat, 
Khartoum‟s intelligence service.
12
  The two intelligence entities formed a strong partnership in 
the counter-insurgency effort in Iraq. Islamic militants utilized Sudan as a crossroads into Iraq 
where they integrated into Al Qaeda and other terrorist cells. Mukhabarat aided Washington by 
detaining terror suspects as they passed through Khartoum as well as sending informants to Iraq 
to infiltrate terrorist groups to provide intelligence on the insurgency.
13
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Sudan seemed to have transitioned post 9/11, from pariah state to one of relative 
normalcy concerning the United States as a result of its efforts in counter-terrorism. For the 
Government of Sudan, this virtually guaranteed its safety from international intervention for its 
actions in Darfur.  It appeared as if the realist camp of the government, in the form of the CIA, 
DIA and others, were winning the battle over those who wanted forced intervention against 
Sudan for its role in the Darfur genocide.  Politicians continued to pay lip service to constituents, 
human rights groups, and NGOs who expected US action. The US Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations held regular testimonies from 2002 to 2008 on Sudan and the prospects for resolution. 
They fully recognized however, that the existence of Janjawid militiamen being trained by the 
government to rape and murder, government sanctioned aerial bombings of Darfuri villages, and 
the forced displacement of millions of people would make peaceful resolution unlikely.
14
  
Along with the nominal improvement regarding Sudanese-American political relations as 
a result of their clandestine intelligence alliance, Sudan also made significant efforts to 
modernize its economy with better tax collection efforts and more opportunity for investment 
from abroad, which pleased the International Monetary Fund, and to a much quieter degree the 
United States.
15
 Presidential campaigns in 2004, notably George W. Bush‟s reelection campaign, 
condemned Sudan and backed economic sanctions in an effort to appease constituents.
16
 Despite 
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the condemnations, there was a noticeable disconnect between US sanctions against Sudan since 
2004 and Sudanese and multinational corporations‟ adherence to it.  Companies like Coca-Cola 
circumvented US sanctions and found loopholes to invest by utilizing third party producers and 
distributers within Sudan.
17
 Sudatel, a Sudanese telecommunications company, virtually 
completely ignored American sanctions in 2007, by expanding into West Africa and 
subsequently Nigeria. Sudatel, which is partially state-owned, was not directly doing business 
with any American firms; however, with Nigeria being a major trade ally of the United States, 
the Sudanese company undoubtedly benefited from American investment and funding in the 
country. 
 The sanctions which were a result of pressure from civil rights groups, a group that did 
not constitute a significant voting block for Bush, and the evangelical and Jewish communities, 
which did, did not fade away after the 2004 elections.  Throughout 2005 and 2006, the United 
States employed its position on the UN Security Council to lead the United Nations to impose a 
travel ban and asset freeze on a number of top officials within the Sudanese government. 
Nonetheless, the bulk of the economic sanctions placed on Sudan had little impact because 
Khartoum did not have any direct trade lines with the United States since 1997. The sanctions 
also had minimal impact because the main source of the country‟s wealth, oil exports, was tied 
primarily to Chinese investment.  Much like the political realists who attempted to persuade the 
Bush Administration not to aggravate Khartoum because of its importance as an ally in the War 
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on Terror, economic realists convinced the Administration of the importance of Sudan as a 
potential source of oil. With energy security destined to become one of the paramount 
geopolitical issues of the 21
st
 Century, economic analysts feared that American alienation of 
Khartoum could push a potential source of non-OPEC oil away from the United States and 
firmly towards its closest economic rival, China.  The shift away from punishing Khartoum‟s oil 
manufacturers is evident in that of the thirty-one Sudanese corporations affected by the new 
sanctions enacted by President Bush in September 2007, only three were oil companies.  
Conversely, eight were agriculture and farming corporations and nine were infrastructure 
developers.
18
   
The primary goal of American policymakers in not putting too much practical pressure 
on the Sudanese oil industry (as opposed to previous mandates in 1997 and 2002), yet using 
powerful and threatening rhetoric, was to gain more influence over Sudan‟s oil industry.
19
 
American policy officials had identified the African oil market as one of fundamental interest to 
American foreign policy and energy security and had been making significant inroads on the 
continent since the late 1990‟s.  African oil however was also a major focus of China, whose 
interest in African oil predates that of the United States.  Presently China imports about one-third 
of its oil from Africa, 9% of the continent‟s total exports in 2006.
20
  China is most heavily 
invested in Sudan in particular. Thirteen of the fifteen most important foreign companies 
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operating in Sudan in 2004 were Chinese and Sudan supplied China with 7% of its oil imports in 
the same year; a number that continued to grow over the next four years.
21
  
Chinese investment, as opposed to Western, also had a noticeable appeal to African 
leaders because it was marketed to them by PRC officials as free of political or human rights 
linkage and colonial aims, factors which were characteristics of Western investment and aid.  As 
a result, Sudanese oil infrastructure and trade developed almost completely independent of 
American aspirations.  These factors, coupled with the fact that sanctions against Sudan barred 
any American oil companies from operating in Sudan, meant that Sudan‟s oil market belonged 
almost exclusively to the PRC. 
With this understanding in mind, Washington declared African oil a priority for US 
national security post 9/11. This was a pragmatic and cynical act because it legitimized the 
United States future actions in the region, which included the establishment of a coordinating 
base, AFRICOM, for American intelligence and military concerns on the continent. 
22
 Prior to 
the establishment of AFRICOM, Washington increased its influence in Sudan by helping to 
facilitate the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Khartoum and the Sudan Peoples‟ 
Liberation Movement (SPLM), the largest and most influential rebel movement in Southern 
Sudan.   
The United States‟ focus on bringing an end to the North-South civil war, whose 
combatants had been warring for two decades with casualties over that time numbering in the 
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millions, may have been inspired by Washington‟s aims at gaining access to Sudan‟s oil markets 
which they posited would be easier in peaceful conditions.  These physical movements were 
accompanied by rhetoric that manifested itself in the form of congressional hearings and 
testimonies in Washington. Senator Lamar Alexander, speaking at a 2004 hearing before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, stated that the first major charge from Senate to pass the Sudan 
Peace Act came in 2002 from Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, his legislation providing a 
framework for peace negotiations in Sudan.  However, the first real steps towards peace between 
the SPLM and Khartoum came in May 2004 with the moderation of the United States and 
several other Western nations, according to Alexander.
23
  
The United States‟ strong influence in the peace process directly coincides with 
intelligence coming from the region that Sudan‟s oil potential was several times greater than first 
predicted by Washington and thus worth consideration.  This is backed up by the fact that the 
United States had little interest in bringing an end to the relatively isolated, but bloody civil war 
prior to 2002 other than stopping its weapon sales to the country in 1987, brokering a wobbly 
ceasefire between factions within the SPLA and their leaders, and beginning to refer to it as a 
rogue state which were accompanied by sanctions in the late 1990s.
24
  
The main purpose of the 2004 Senate hearing, which is apparent in the title, was to 
determine the cost to Darfur, in terms of casualties and destruction, of bringing an end to the 
Sudanese civil war.  Several senators, including Alexander and Feingold acknowledged that 
                                                            
 
23 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sudan: Peace but at what Price?, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004, S. HRG. 
108–666, 2. 
24 Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2006), 96, 109.  
29 
 
some policymakers in Washington were concerned that confronting Khartoum too directly over 
its actions in Darfur could jeopardize any prospect for lasting peace in Southern Sudan.
25
 While 
discussing the potential of tying the North-South agreement to the Darfur genocide, the hearing 
as well as history shows that Washington‟s efforts in halting the Sudanese civil war was much 
more organized and advanced at that time than were its efforts in resolving Darfur.  This is 
characterized by the fact that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the SPLM and the 
Government of Sudan was signed seven months later in January 2005, yet there is still currently 
no similar long lasting peace agreement in place for Darfur, six years later.  
It is logical to assert that the reason behind Washington‟s inability to broker a similar 
deal for Darfur to the one it helped facilitate for the North-South civil war is because of the 
complexity and timing of the crisis, with the North-South Agreement reaching its pinnacle and 
the global War on Terror in full swing.  However, Steve Fake and Kevin Funk state that there is 
a much more cynical reason behind the stall in negotiations for Darfur.  As previously stated, the 
discovery of oil in the Darfur region made finding a resolution to the Darfur genocide much 
more difficult for American analysts.  Fake and Funk argue that Washington softened its rhetoric 
and hand wringing towards Khartoum on the humanitarian disaster because it had hoped to 
improve relations with the Government of Sudan in an effort to potentially increase its control of 
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It is misleading to portray that the United States made no effort in trying to facilitate a 
peace agreement in Darfur.  In 2006, Congressman Christopher H. Smith of New Jersey stated 
that Washington under President Bush “deserves to be commended for its tenacious efforts to 
help broker this agreement and to ease the suffering of those most affected by the genocide in 
Darfur.”
27
 The DPA, which was modeled after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, was an 
effort that attracted the participation of the African Union- in the form of AMIS, the United 
Nations Security Council, a number of NGOs, and the main factions of the conflict- the 
Government of Sudan and the two main rebel groups in Darfur, the Sudan Peoples‟ Liberation 
Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).  The agreement, which was 
signed on May 5, 2006 by ranking government officials and by Minni Minawi of the largest 
faction of the SLM, addressed the marginalization of Darfuri ethnic groups in terms of 
government participation and wealth sharing.
28
   
The DPA however was a significant failure, as predicted by Jan Pronk, the UN Secretary-
General‟s Special Representative in Sudan. Most rebel factions acting in Darfur rejected the 
agreement as it did not resonate with the people in Darfur, forces from both sides including the 
Janjawid continued the fighting, and the international community did not follow up their 
mediations with implementation.
29
 The US played a pervasive role in both the forming of the 
agreement and its failure.  As previously mentioned, American policymakers and officials in 
Washington struggled with deciding which crisis, the North-South civil war or the Darfur 
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genocide, was more crucial to American foreign policy and security interests in the region.  The 
United States, which perceived the North-South civil war as the more vital of the two in the early 
years of the Darfur crisis, saw reasonable success in its implementation efforts of a peace accord 
between the two factions in that conflict.  Washington was thus motivated to apply virtually the 
same tactics used in the North-South civil war to resolve the Darfur crisis, a conflict which was 
much different because it involved many more rebel factions and was less structured when 
compared with the former.   
In its anxiousness to find peace in Darfur like it did to a degree in Southern Sudan, 
Washington amongst others in the international community coerced the main warring parties to 
the negotiation table, which excluded common Darfuris and many other diminutive groups 
whose concerns were not addressed.
30
 This action led to a ceasefire that lasted no longer than a 
month, further division of Darfuri rebel groups into smaller and weaker factions which worked to 
the advantage of Janjawid militias that were able to attack villages almost unabated, and more 
death and destruction in the region.  
At later congressional hearings US politicians recognized the rebel groups‟ division as a 
serious weakness that Khartoum was taking advantage of, yet took no responsibility for the 
further divisions it caused amongst the rebel groups with its sponsorship of the failed DPA.  In 
an opening statement at an April 2007 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Senator 
Joseph Biden of Delaware speaking on the state of the rebel groups stated, “… I urged them to 
come up with a common program. I offered to host them in Congress if they did. I warned them 
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that if they did not, Khartoum would use their division as an excuse to do nothing. We need a 
major sustained diplomatic initiative to bring these rebels together.”
31
  The DPA backfired on the 
Bush Administration, which sought a quick and lasting peace in Darfur to match the peace in 
Southern Sudan. Peace in the region would have appeased constituents, NGOs, and other 
activists important to the Administration as well as helped the United States maintain its image 
as the world‟s defender of human welfare and continue its process of normalization with Sudan 
uninterrupted.  
Normalization vis-à-vis Sudan was important to American foreign policy interests. It 
would allow American oil corporations to make inroads into the Sudanese oil market, and build a 
better working relationship concerning the War on Terror. Though not obvious, the goal of 
normalization is nevertheless apparent in the language of some American politicians. Making a 
statement at a hearing in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Andrew S. Natsios, 
the President‟s Special Envoy to Sudan, claimed that, “Our focus is on human rights and on 
humanitarian issues. We have no military or economic interest in Darfur.”
32
  However, American 
politicians make several comments that seem contrary to that of the Department of State official.  
Senator Feingold, speaking at a hearing before the Senate on Foreign Relations states, “There 
can be no normalization of relations between the United States and Sudan while this crisis 
continues. That government should expect no support, financial, political, or otherwise, from the 
US Government and the US taxpayers until meaningful action has been taken to stop the 
violence, to protect civilians, and to cooperate with relief efforts rather than bogging them down 
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with shakedowns and obstructions disguised as petty administrative requests.”
33
 Likewise, 
Senator Biden acknowledged while speaking at an April 2008 hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations that the Bush Administration and Khartoum had been in 
meetings in Rome regarding rapprochement between the United States and Sudan, although he 
follows up this acknowledgement with a statement of political posturing, that normalization 
should not occur until steps are taken by Khartoum to end hostilities with rebel groups, allow 
UN-AU peacekeeping troops into the region, and allow the humanitarian effort to reach the 
victims of the tragedy.
34
      
US support for the efforts of the United Nations in resolving the conflict is also a point of 
contention.  Historically, the UN and US were on opposite sides of the geopolitical spectrum, 
most of all because of the United States perceived prerogative as an unrivaled superpower over 
the last two decades, to pursue its national interests without being bound by multi-lateral 
decision making entities such as the UN; Darfur was no different.
35
   While rhetoric from 
Washington shows that the Bush Administration was in full support of the United Nations aims 
in Darfur, its actions showed otherwise.  
During the Darfur genocide, the UN, whose role will be discussed in depth in the 
proceeding chapter, took a number of steps to bring peace to Darfur and to bring the perpetrators 
of the genocide to justice.  Some of these steps however, were disparate from the goals and 
interests pursued by the United States for the region, and thus put the two entities at odds. 
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Utilizing its role on the Security Council, the United States threatened to vote against a UN 
resolution to refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC). This action 
was taken because Washington feared that the ICC in its investigation would have jurisdiction 
over all nationals operating in Sudan, including those of the United States.
36
 Stating worry for 
national sovereignty as the motivating factor, American policymakers genuinely feared that the 
ICC‟s actions in Sudan, which is a sovereign nation, could set a precedent that empowers the 
International Criminal Court to perform investigations in places such as Iraq, where the actions 
of US troops would be heavily scrutinized and brought into question, threatening American 
foreign policy interests.   
To counteract the ICC commission in Darfur, which could have brought American troops 
and officials under the Rome Statute - a series of international laws meant to punish perpetrators 
of serious international crimes, US officials in January 2005 proposed the use of a UN criminal 
tribunal modeled after a similar court used in Rwanda.
37
 The proposal to create a criminal 
tribunal had many opponents.  Americans who supported referring Sudan to the ICC as the 
„single best mechanism‟ for justice in Darfur, as well as officials of member nations of the 
Security Council that supported the court argued that Washington‟s fears of a politically 
motivated and uncontrollable ICC could never occur because the court was essentially under the 
control of the Security Council, of which the United States is a member.
38
 Human rights groups 
vehemently opposed the proposal because they saw the measure, which would have taken time to 
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plan and establish, as stalling on providing aid and relief to the people of Darfur.  The Bush 
Administration, as they perceived the situation, put its foreign interests and ideological 
opposition to the existence of such a court before the lives of millions of Darfuri nationals 
affected by genocide.
39
  The ICC resolution did not stall as long as feared however, and was 
passed on March 31, 2005; the United States abstention and not rejection helped to pass the 
resolution. 
For the Bush Administration, Darfur represented an enigma that was, in the eyes of some 
of its analysts, unsolvable. From the moment of Secretary of State Colin Powell‟s declaration of 
genocide the United States has been expected, as the protector of humanity, to muster the 
international community to intervene in Darfur, bringing those responsible in the Government of 
Sudan to justice and bringing an end to the suffering of the people of Darfur.  In actuality, a 
number of influences played a role in the decision making of the Bush Administration which 
brought its intervention effort to a halt before ever it started.  The War on Terror forced the 
United States to form a useful yet uneasy alliance with Sudan in providing intelligence on 
terrorist cells acting throughout East Africa and the Middle East.   Domestic terrorism by the 
Government of Sudan against the people of Darfur was thus overlooked by American 
policymakers because Sudan was too important as an intelligence-sharing entity to be alienated 
by Washington. Likewise, energy security in the form of African oil was a primary factor of 
American foreign policy interests that seriously affected its efforts in Darfur.  The Sudanese oil 
market, which had grown substantially over the last decade, was declared to be of key 
                                                            
 





importance to American security coincidentally when Darfur was in the throes of genocide.  
Policymakers began to push for a normalization of the economic relationship with Sudan so that 
American oil companies, who had not been allowed to operate in Sudan since the mid 90‟s, 
could begin competing with the likes of China for investment opportunities in the oil rich nation. 
Although rhetoric and media influenced propaganda from the Bush Administration got tougher 
against Khartoum for its actions in the crisis, American moves to hold the Government of Sudan 




CHAPTER TWO: THE UNITED NATIONS- NO SHOULDERS TO BEAR 
THE BLAME 
 
 Ten years after the Rwandan genocide, the United Nations was asked to intervene, with a 
swifter and stronger response, to atrocities in Darfur.  Under the leadership of Secretary General 
Kofi Annan, the United Nations conducted many fact finding missions and developed reports on 
the humanitarian crisis that was unfolding in Darfur in order to mobilize its member states to 
commit to providing economic, political, and humanitarian aid to the people of Darfur and to 
hold the Government of Sudan responsible for the overly brutal tactics it had utilized to quell the 
rebellion in Darfur, which left the region in devastating condition.  What resulted was a 
disingenuous response from member states that had disparate views on how to approach the 
Darfur question and stagnation in regard to improvement of the situation from a diplomatic 
perspective because of Khartoum‟s skill in stalling and stifling, which were greater than the 
efforts of the United Nations.  It also resulted in a humanitarian response that could not reach the 
intended victims due to the staunchly resistant Sudanese government as well as the poor 
conditions of roads and other infrastructure that should have led to the intended targets. 
 The United Nations‟ failure to negotiate an end to the crisis did not fall squarely on the 
shoulders of the organization and its leader Kofi Annan.  The United States along with other 
member states, which had always been wary of the organization, pressured the United Nations to 
follow their recommendations pertaining to Darfur; in cases where it did not, the same countries 
provided little support. When failure was realized, they pointed out the UN as being the main 
catalyst for the breakdown, turning the organization into a scapegoat.  The United Nations was 
38 
 
also being pressured by its members to deal with crises in sequence, meaning that at the 
beginning of the Darfur conflict when it would have been most pertinent to respond, the UN was 
fully involved in the North-South peace process.
1
 In addition, the Sudanese government‟s efforts 
in obstructing UN progress towards unified action in Darfur proved effective.  From a 
humanitarian standpoint, the United Nations was stretched paper thin in the region having been 
involved with the humanitarian relief effort in Southern Sudan from the outset.  Annan also 
feared that strong action against Sudan by the United Nations could appear as neocolonialism by 
the West to Middle Eastern nations, as the existence of oil in the region could be seen as a 
motivating factor in a humanitarian invasion.  Most importantly, the United Nations failed in 
Darfur because it had very little support en masse.  The international community or the member 
states of the UN Security Council more specifically, did not want to commit excessive amounts 
of effort and manpower to bring an end to the catastrophe if such action had the potential to 
impair their national or foreign policy interests. 
 The United Nations‟ presence in Sudan was already strong at the time the crisis began in 
Darfur due to the Sudanese civil war. Although mostly isolated in Southern Sudan, where aid at 
the time was most needed, the UN was spending $300 million a year in Sudan on employing 
manpower, humanitarian assistance, and the maintenance of a large fleet of aircraft and 
vehicles.
2
  Throughout the early and middle months of 2003, reports continued to trickle onto the 
desks of UN officials residing in Khartoum from survivors of villages in Western Sudan that 
were being brutally attacked and destroyed, further stating that there was a pattern to the attacks.   
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By November 2003 UN officials in Khartoum, under the regional leadership of Dr. 
Mukesh Kapila, learned that the patterned occurrences being reported throughout the year were 
in actuality an organized campaign to rid Western Sudan of its African inhabitants by the 
Government of Sudan with the aid of Janjawid militiamen.
3
 The destruction of African ethnic 
groups in the region was ordered in retaliation to a string of defeats starting with the April 25, 
2003 attack on a government air base in al Fasher Darfur by a combined group of rebels from the 
Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement which resulted in the deaths of 
seventy five Sudanese soldiers, the capture of thirty two more, and the destruction of several 
warplanes and helicopters at the air field.
4
 Kapila responded by sending a memorandum to 
Annan and the UN headquarters in late November 2003 informing them of the pending 
humanitarian catastrophe that was developing as a result of the violence and destruction, stating 
that the international community must pressure the Government of Sudan into bringing a halt to 
Janjawid attacks and its own airstrikes in the region.
5
 
 The Sudanese government, recognizing the international community‟s potential for 
interference in its plans, began using obstruction tactics as early as September 2003, when it 
allowed humanitarian aid access to only 500,000 IDPs that were previously cut off to relief.
6
 In 
December 2003, United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland held a press 
conference to mobilize the international community and to bring attention to the conflict. 
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Regarding the disaster, Egeland gravely claimed, "The humanitarian situation in Darfur has 
quickly become one of the worst in the world. Access to people in need is blocked by the parties 
in conflict and now, as the need for aid grows, stocks of relief materials are dwindling."
7
 Egeland 
went further in the press conference to refer to both the Sudanese government and the rebel 
groups as “combatants” and blamed both sides for the lack of access to victims, citing 
international law as a reason to allow humanitarian workers safe access to the refugees.
8
 Kofi 
Annan and other UN officials did not know how to contend with the organization‟s inability to 
get relief to IDPs.  
 To counteract inaccessibility, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees began relocating 
IDPs away from the Darfur-Chad border, where the Sudanese troops and Janjawid were 
conducting most of their attacks, and deeper into Chad to UN built safe camps in early 2004.  
Refugees quickly overwhelmed these sites, pouring into these camps by the tens of thousands, 
which enflamed the humanitarian catastrophe further and increased political tension between 
Sudan and Chad.  Janjawid militia were not relenting their attack and with support from the 
Sudanese government with bombers and fighter planes, the Janjawid led a devastating offensive, 
sacking and burning Darfuri villages as well as refugee camps on the Chadian border.
9
    By mid 
2004, the situation in Darfur began to draw stark comparisons to the Rwandan genocide ten years 
earlier from many analysts and human rights groups. 
                                                            
 
7 UN News Centre, “Humanitarian and security situations in western Sudan reach new lows, UN agency says,” UN 
News Service, http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=9094&Cr=sudan&Cr1= (accessed March 20, 
2010). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Prunier, 102. 
41 
 
 Egeland and other officials already recognized the situation in Darfur as ethnic cleansing 
at the hands of the Government of Sudan based on briefs and reports of scorched-earth tactics 
and the targeting of black ethnic groups, particularly the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa.
10
 Their 
beliefs were confirmed when reports arrived that Darfur‟s IDP population had reached one 
million in May 2004 and that numerous UN calls to the Sudanese government to disarm the 
Janjawid, including several from Kofi Annan, had fallen on deaf ears.  Despite nominal 
ceasefires and a slight increase in funding, the situation continued to deteriorate due to UN aid 
resources not having the ability to keep up with demands for food, water, and medicine.  In 
situations where the UN provided adequate aid, some of the supplies never reached their targets 
because of theft and blockage by the Sudanese government and, to a lesser extent, the rebel 
groups.  Pledges to stop the bombings and support for the Janjawid by the Sudanese had very 
little weight behind them with fighter planes and gunships often strafing rebel villages and cities 
only moments after meetings with UN officials had concluded.
11
    
 Throughout 2004, the United Nations faced many stonewalls and intricacies on how to 
resolve the burgeoning crisis without making too many aggressive moves, upsetting the delicate 
balance in East Africa and potentially allowing the situation to spill out and cause exponentially 
greater damage. Its task got significantly harder when US Secretary of State Colin Powell, only 
two months after a fact finding trip to Sudan with Kofi Annan, declared on September 9, 2004 
that what he perceived was taking place in Darfur was genocide.  The overly pragmatic United 
Nations under Annan, whose multiple efforts at forging peace agreements with Omar al-Bashir 
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had been unsuccessful, was rocked by the declaration because it committed the United Nations to 
take action based on the 1948 Genocide Convention. Although Powell‟s statement was not 
backed with any American commitment to action, as a member of the Security Council and 
based on the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, it became the UN‟s duty to use appropriate 
means to ensure the safety of the population of Darfur from crimes against humanity. 
 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which was not formally recognized by the 
United Nations General Assembly until September 16, 2005, was nevertheless a set of principles 
that had already enjoyed a position of influence within the realm of international law since its 
conceptualization in 2001.
12
 The main principles of the doctrine are rooted in the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions from which the main ideals of international humanitarian law were 
developed.
13
 The key aspects of R2P that are embraced by the UN General Assembly state that 
“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention 
of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means…,” and that 
“The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI 
and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity…”
14
 Most importantly, the norm governs that the international 
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community, through the approval of the Security Council, take collective action in situations that 
peaceful means have proven to be inadequate.
15
  
 The R2P doctrine was adopted by the UN for several reasons.  First, in regard to safety, 
security and the protection of human rights, member states of the UN could rarely come to a 
consensus on what should be considered commonly shared humanitarian principles; the 
subjective nature of cultural and political differences between member states were difficult to 
overcome.
16
  The R2P resolution, as a set of norms, was meant to provide a structure through 
which to analyze a situation, regardless of cultural or political disparities, to determine if human 
rights abuses are taking place or can potentially take place, and the level of response which is 
warranted (mediation, economic sanctions, a peacekeeping force).  
Second, it defines the role of the Security Council, as the de facto head of the 
international community, in responding to crimes against humanity.  The Security Council is 
responsible for maintaining world peace and security, particularly its permanent five members.  
Before the adoption of the R2P resolution, the Security Council, who had the sole right to 
intervene militarily in the most extreme violations of human rights, could be stifled by the veto 
power of the permanent five.
17
 After the introduction of the resolution, state interests are in 
theory overpowered as the Security Council is now obligated to prevent or bring an end to the 
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existence of genocides, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing wherever any 
of these factors exist.
18
  
Third, in previous conflicts where those four factors existed, such as Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, the Security Council was noticeably reactive to the humanitarian disasters that were 
ongoing.  The R2P resolution influences the international community to take preventive 
measures to deter the potential perpetrating states from committing serious transgressions, which 




 Despite its strong support amongst member states and adoption by the United Nations 
General Assembly, the R2P resolution was nonetheless criticized for its shortcomings. Alex J. 
Bellamy argues in his article, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur 
and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq,” that it has become harder for some member states of 
the permanent five, particularly the United States and Great Britain, to convince other nations to 
answer the call for humanitarian emergencies such as Darfur, when they are engaged in conflicts 
that are causing humanitarian issues themselves.
20
 The author goes on to show that the merging 
of national interests and humanitarianism for the United States after September 11
th
, with its 
attempts at justifying the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and later Iraq as humanitarian 
intervention, has not only discredited the R2P doctrine in some ways, but also affected their 
ability to be carriers of the humanitarian banner.   
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On one hand, some members of the Security Council opposed the use of the International 
Criminal Court in Sudan because it threatened state sovereignty.  However, as shown by the 
United States experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, the significance of state sovereignty was 
greatly diminished because the United States invaded those sovereign states without Security 
Council approval. Bellamy makes the point that American officials cited state failure as their 
reason for invasion. In the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, state failure would have led to 
humanitarian disasters in the form of terrorist attacks, making intervention there a moral 
responsibility for the United States, a position that was readily exploited by Washington.
21
   
 Another major argument against the R2P doctrine concerns the selectivity of the Security 
Council. In other words, opponents fear an inherent bias for member states to use R2P when it is 
politically or economically beneficial for them, or an individual or state that is politically 
important to their interests.
22
 In this, they further fear the use of R2P by members of the Security 
Council who are often the most technologically advanced and most developed countries in the 
world, to rationalize their invasion and “rebuilding” of underdeveloped nations. Skeptical of their 
humanitarian aims, opponents claim that R2P allows „civilized‟ nations to legally advance their 




 In Darfur, the R2P norm did have a profound effect in respect to immediate action by the 
Security Council. However, questions over implementation and concerns regarding the disparate 
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opinions on how to approach the crisis by members of the Security Council yet still, hampered 
the United Nation‟s ability to utilize the R2P doctrine to persuade the international community 
into giving it the necessary funding and manpower to intervene in Darfur.  The UN prior to the 
adoption of the resolution could not prevent the escalation of the conflict, which had resulted in 
approximately 180,000 deaths by the spring of 2005, most of which were civilian fatalities.
24
 The 
use of weak sanctions, fact finding missions, ceasefires, proposals, and commitments from the 
Sudanese government to disarm the Janjawid and bring a halt to the use of heavy weaponry on 
Darfuri villages had paid no dividends in terms of lives.  
 From September 2004 to September 2005, the UN Security Council passed several 
resolutions which created the United Nations Mission in Sudan (Resolution 1590), attempted to 
stifle Khartoum‟s use of heavy weaponry in Darfur by requiring it seek approval before it moved 
any equipment into the Darfur region (Resolution 1591), and threatened the Sudanese 
government with referral to the International Criminal Court (Resolution 1593).
25
 None of these 
initiatives had the influence intended.  The most influential UN Security Council resolution came 
after the advent of R2P, and could not have been possible without its adoption.  In July 2006, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 1706, which called for a 17,300 troop UN peacekeeping 
force to supplement the wavering African Union force that was already in Darfur, having been 
accepted by Khartoum in late 2004, but was failing to make a difference.
26
 With the passing of 
Resolution 1706, the strongest step to UN intervention in Darfur had been made.  However, 
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questions over how to staff and lead the force, the weakness of its mandate, and how to 
circumvent Khartoum and its efforts at blocking international aid had yet to be answered. 
 The first major road block for the UN indeed came in the form of Sudanese opposition to 
the peacekeeping force.  Khartoum, which had successfully blocked attempts from the UN to 
send a team to investigate human rights abuses in Darfur, was fully intent on not allowing such a 
force into the region.
27
 Realizing that the lack of success from African Union peacekeepers could 
potentially lead to them being replaced by United Nations peacekeepers that would be more 
capable of asserting their will in Darfur, Sudanese President al-Bashir began to incite issues 
between the AU and UN, stating that only African troops under African command would be 
acceptable.
28
 Al-Bashir questioned the credibility of the African Union by insinuating that the 
UN could not be controlled by the AU, further stating that a colonial status would be installed in 
Sudan and soon the rest of Africa if the issues in Darfur did not remain strictly an African 
problem. By causing distractions such as these, al-Bashir effectively suppressed a consorted 
effort between the United Nations and African Union, allowing Khartoum to continue its military 
actions in the region. 
 Although al-Bashir made it clear that he would never allow Resolution 1706 to fulfill its 
goals in Sudan, politicians throughout the international community continued to heap pressure on 
him and the Sudanese government to allow the 17,000 troop peacekeeping force into Darfur.  In 
September 2006, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, speaking at a meeting of several world 
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leaders proclaimed, “As President Bush said on Tuesday, if the Sudanese government does not 
approve the peacekeeping force quickly, the United Nations must find a way to act.”
29
 UN 
sanctioned no-fly zones and heavy weapons bans had proven ineffective thus far, as had 
economic sanctions. The veiled threat of open confrontation with the West conversely, seemed to 
have lightened Khartoum‟s outright rejection of UN troops in the region.  After diplomatic 
meetings with officials from the European Union, the Government of Sudan stated that it would 
be willing to accept United Nations peacekeeping troops into Darfur, although only to bolster the 
numbers of AU troops already there, and only under the leadership of African commanders.
30
 
After claiming that this was unacceptable, Security Council diplomats acquiesced to the demands 
of Khartoum, leading to the development of a joint AU/UN force, with United Nations troops 
taking the role of „technical assistants‟ or advisors.
31
 
 With Khartoum now firmly dictating the shape of Resolution 1706, the Security Council 
was once again at a standstill.  Kofi Annan and other UN officials fully understood that the weak 
and directionless African Union force in Darfur, even with the support of the UN, would not be 
able to sustain peace in the region.  Resolution 1769 was thus passed by the Security Council 
giving the mandate to create a hybrid force, known as UNAMID (the United Nations-African 
Union Mission in Darfur), and detailing the means of transition from the African Union Mission 
in Sudan to UNAMID, including command structure.
32
 There was also language within the 
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resolution for UNAMID to guarantee progression of the DPA, and to enforce a ceasefire between 
the Government of Sudan and rebel groups.  Mamdani argues that there is an intrinsic 
discrepancy within the resolution.  The author states that the resolution called for the promotion 
by UNAMID, of a political agreement and ceasefire between the Sudanese government and rebel 
groups through the application of the DPA, which was a program that had already failed because 
nothing had been agreed between belligerents.
33
 He further claims that the West did not want a 
political agreement, showing that when the opportunity had arisen to put pressure on rebel 
groups who were unwilling to negotiate with the Sudanese government, where the government 




       Unsurprisingly, al-Bashir went back on his vow to allow a UN force into Darfur, 
stating that the UN could provide technical and financial support to the African Union, but no 
UN troops would be allowed in the region.
35
 Naturally, the UN responded with a series of tough 
but ultimately limited sanctions against Darfur.  In addition to the problems caused by Khartoum, 
UNAMID had a more innate issue in that it could barely field a force to account for, with only a 
few nations offering troops to man the mission.  By the end of Kofi Annan‟s ten year tenure as 
Secretary General on January 1, 2007, the United Nations was no closer to bringing a halt to 
what was gradually being termed the “the next Rwanda,” in Darfur.  2007 was wrought with 
inaction from the moneyless African Union, a lack of power projection from the Security 
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Council and disillusionment amongst its member states, and more rejections and objections from 
the Sudanese government.  Multilateral intervention in Darfur, through UN action, required full 
commitment from powerful members of the international community.  The UN General 
Assembly, with many developing countries that had a sympathetic perspective of the situation in 
Darfur, showed the necessary commitment. However, member nations of the Security Council 
each with separate geopolitical goals and interests, as well as interests in Sudan, did not respond 
with the intent required to bolster the United Nations hopes of peacefully resolving the conflict. 
 China, which had been earlier identified as a key business partner for Sudan, was heavily 
invested in Sudan‟s budding oil industry at the time of the crisis.  Energy security to fuel its 
booming economy was China‟s primary concern in reference to Africa.  To further this goal, the 
PRC marketed itself to Africa as the most ideal trading partner because it was not inclined to tie 
economics and trade to human rights, unlike the West.  Due to these factors, China was at odds 
with Western states that recognized the PRC‟s economic partnership with Sudan as a means for 
Sudan to dodge UN sanctions.  As one of the permanent five members of the Security Council, 
China used its position to protect Sudan from major UN action by abstaining from or objecting a 
number of resolutions, citing the national belief of noninterference in the internal affairs of 
foreign countries, a pillar of Chinese policy, as the reason.
36
   
Unlike most Western states, China did not see the utility in the Security Council focusing 
its energies on developing a large peacekeeping force that had the potential to lead to further 
death and destruction, with al-Bashir stating that any large force entering a sovereign UN 
member state without its permission could be taken as an act of aggression.  Instead, China saw 
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the crisis in Darfur as one requiring a political settlement; considering that it was in essence a 
civil war.  In this, China did pressure Sudan to the negotiating table and appealed to Omar al-
Bashir to allow a small UN peacekeeping force, in its truest form, to maintain peace in the 
region.  For China, with its massive investments in the Sudanese oil industry, this was the most 
logical method of intervention.  
 As another member of the permanent five, Russia played a lesser known, but decisive 
role in the United Nations weak intervention effort in Darfur.  Prior to the Darfur crisis, Russia 
was a primary supplier of heavy and mid-grade military weaponry to Sudan.  Likewise, Russian 
aircraft and vehicles are prevalent in Sudanese airways and highways.
37
 During the crisis, Russia 
identified Sudan as a potentially wealthy business opportunity where it had hoped to develop 
partnerships in the oil, pipeline, power generation, water resource, and railroad transportation 
industries.
38
 Because of this, Russia looked to emulate China in not fostering UN resolutions that 
enabled strict sanctions on Sudan.   
Although Russia recognized China as an economic rival in Sudan, Russian officials often 
voted lockstep with their Chinese counterparts.  Both nations abstained from vote on Resolution 
1706, claiming that a force of that magnitude could lead to a militant response from Sudan.  Both 
were also lockstep when they denied a charge from Amnesty International that both countries 
breached a UN arms embargo, after an Amnesty International study found that Sudan imported 
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$45 million of materiel since 2005, when the embargo was instituted.
39
 Russia‟s position as a 
supporter of the Bashir regime while simultaneously being a permanent five member of the 
Security Council, also hampered the Council‟s ability to utilize the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine to bring perpetrating members of the Darfur genocide within the Khartoum regime to 
justice.  Out of twenty UN resolutions that include a reference to Responsibility to Protect 
regarding Darfur, Russia abstained from seven.
40
 
 From the outset, the Darfur crisis had been marginal to the interests of the Arab world. 
Much like its stance towards Sudan during the North-South civil war, the Arab League, 
representing the Arab world, backed the Sudanese government in Darfur.  There are several 
potential reasons why the Arab League fully backed the Government of Sudan, despite evidence 
which showed the government had adopted a policy of ethnic cleansing against the African 
population of Darfur, almost all of whom were Muslim.  It was likely that the Arab League 
backed Khartoum because of its suspicion of Western interest in the region.  Many Arab 
scholars, journalists, and policymakers felt that the West was inciting African ethnic groups in 
Darfur to rebel against Khartoum, which would cause Khartoum to respond with force, 
prompting the West to intervene and take charge in Sudan, also taking charge of all the country‟s 
natural wealth.
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Another reason for the indifference in the Arab League was the racial makeup of Sudan.  
To the Arab world, Sudan was more African than Arab, as virtually all Sudanese- African or 
Arab, appeared black in skin color.  Despite the Sudan‟s role as the breadbasket of the Arab 
world, it is still viewed by most Middle Eastern states as outside their cultural dynamic.
42
 
Therefore to the Arab world, it was more important to focus on events in Iraq and Palestine that 
were taking place simultaneously, because they were distinctly Arab.
43
 Yet another reason for 
the indifference shown by the Arab League is the propensity for Arab nations to either protect, or 
stay out of each other‟s way when one is accused of committing atrocities by the global 
community.
44
 Due to these factors, and despite pressure from the West to act decisively 
regarding Sudan, the Arab world was relatively ineffective in supporting the multilateral 
intervention effort in Darfur.         
Great Britain, the former colonial masters of Sudan, was plagued by its past position as 
colonizer as well as its relationship with the United States.  Like its American counterparts, 
Great Britain was heavily involved in Iraq and as a result was losing its international identity as a 
flag bearer of human rights and humanitarianism.  Also, as a result of their full participation in 
the War on Terror, British armed forces were stretched too thin to fully support armed 
intervention in Sudan.  Consequently, threats from British politicians to the Sudanese 
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government, stating that the United Kingdom would act to protect the people of Darfur if 
Khartoum could not, were perceived as empty.   
Falling in line with other members of the Security Council who did not have strategic 
interests in Darfur or did not have the power projection capabilities to act on their interests, Great 
Britain backed the use of economic sanctions and no-fly zones, both of which had limitations and 
had little impact on the Sudanese government.  Great Britain‟s firm stance with the United States 
on Iraq and Darfur put it at odds with other member states of the European Union.  EU member 
states such as France and Germany were opposed to the war in Iraq, which had a great effect on 
the EU‟s ability to coordinate a unified response to the Darfur question.
45
 With ambiguity shown 
from Washington, as well as a lack of resolve from the European Union, Great Britain had no 
clear direction on how to approach Darfur, making them solely reliant on their humanitarian aid 
to have an impact in the region and rendering them virtually ineffectual as a UN Security 
Council member state. 
The United Nations, despite the efforts of officials such as Kofi Annan, was doomed 
before it started in its efforts to resolve the genocide in Darfur.  The global community, with 
memories of the Rwandan genocide still fresh, expected the United Nations to be well prepared 
ten years later to prevent a similar catastrophe from occurring again.  In actuality, the UN was a 
weaker organization than ever before, now being fully reliant on member states that were first 
and foremost committed to their own national interests, to provide the necessary financial, 
diplomatic, and military means to act in Darfur.  Without the full support of its member states, 
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particularly powerful members such as China and the United States, the United Nations could 
carry little more than the humanitarian burden in Darfur.  
Contending with the Sudanese government, which was intent on blocking all of the 
United Nations efforts in gaining access to the region, proved difficult as well. The 
organization‟s focus on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, at the behest of the international 
community who believed the North-South civil war to be a more important conflict, played to the 
advantage of Khartoum who continued its policy of ethnic cleansing in Darfur unabated.  The 
implementation of useful instruments such as the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in 2005, 
appeared to pay dividends in the form of new and potent resolutions, yet continued rejections 
from Darfur and a divided Security Council hindered the full use of the Responsibility to Protect 
norm.  In its attempts to maintain a delicate balance between upholding the global political status 
quo, to not violate the rights of a sovereign state, and to fully supporting the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, all of which were necessary to ensure its very survival as an influential 
geopolitical entity, the United Nations rendered itself incapable of finding an adequate and 
lasting answer to the Darfur question.
56 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND DARFUR- THE 
TRANSITION FROM APATHETIC BENEFACTION TO PERIPHERAL 
ENGAGEMENT   
 
 European involvement in Africa since the era of African independence has been 
paramount in the latter‟s political, economic, and infrastructural advancement.  The bilateral 
relationship has benefited both parties concerning trade and diplomacy. However, in regard to 
regional security in Africa, the relationship has failed to develop over the last fifty years.  
Africa‟s security deficit was a primary concern for the European Union in the new millennium, 
which Europe bears some responsibility due to the 1884 Berlin Conference where existing 
African empires and chiefdoms were divided amongst European powers.  In the ten years prior to 
the Darfur crisis, the Europe Community (EC), in partnership with the United Nations, had 
become increasingly involved in the resolution process for African conflicts.  The European 
Union had been a driving force in decreasing violent conflict in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and the Great Lakes Region.  As previously shown, the EU also played a profound role in 
developing resolutions to the Sudanese civil war.  
 The EC‟s shift over the ten years prior to the Darfur crisis pertaining to African security 
can be correlated to the evolution of the European Community‟s Africa policy. Due to the lack of 
success in adequately ending African conflicts, the EC adopted an approach that tied regional 
security to economic partnership.  The bilateral relationship was thus based on the linkage 
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between human rights, fair governance and economic development.
1
 Through this process, 
Europe was able to reaffirm its control, to an extent, over Africa as African states pushed for 
stability in order to reap the benefits of European economic investment.  The latter stages of the 
Lome Agreement (1989‟s Lome IV) and the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 promoted the 
democratization of African states, as well as the recognition of inherent human rights.  As a 
result of this approach, military intervention to prevent conflict and maintain security in Africa 
as a crisis management tool for the European Community was not prevalent. 
 In 2003, the escalating conflict in Darfur exposed the underlying frailties of linking 
economic investment to human rights and crisis prevention for the European Community.  Sudan 
as a sovereign African state had not received any major forms of economic aid from Western 
nations since 1996, when it was placed under economic sanction by the United Nations for 
ignoring Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070, and by the United States for being a state sponsor of 
terrorism.
2
 As a result Sudan turned to the Middle East, to whom it marketed itself as a potential 
breadbasket for the entire Muslim world, and to China, whose investment in Africa had been on 
a steady rise in the post-Mao era, and was set to increase exponentially as it recognized Sudan 
along with the entire African continent as a pertinent source of natural resources to fuel its 
booming economy.  Consequently, the burgeoning and modernizing Sudanese economy of the 
waning years of the twentieth century and fledgling years of the twenty-first, developed almost 
completely independent of Western influence.  Where the European Union had succeeded 
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previously in resolving crises in Africa (Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Angola, Cote d‟Ivoire, etc.) with 
the promise of economic aid in the form of “humanitarian assistance” and the introduction of a 
nominal force of peacekeeping troops, it failed in the early stages of the Darfur crisis by relying 
on the same tactics. 
 The use of economics in the form of threatening economic sanctions and the denial of 
investment by corporations and nationals within the control of the European Union performed 
with marginal results during the beginning phases of the Darfur crisis.  The Government of 
Sudan, who was being pressured by the European Community to work towards a lasting and 
effective ceasefire with Darfuri rebels, was virtually unconcerned with the prospect of a 
European embargo on Sudanese goods and resources due to its budding relationship with the 
People‟s Republic of China.
3
  In China, Sudan found a global trading partner who could rival and 
potentially outperform the West economically and was fundamentally opposed to linking 
economic investment to political ideology or human rights.
4
 China‟s existence as a viable source 
of aid and investment for Sudan undermined the efforts of the European Union to resolve the 
conflict through economic means. 
 Militarily, the EC was collectively unwilling to commit the necessary manpower and 
funding to bring about an end to the crisis in its initial stages through armed intervention. 
Although seventeen of the twenty-five EU member states provided military or civilian 
peacekeeping forces to the African continent at the beginning of the crisis, they were minimal in 
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size with most consisting of ten or less troops.  Many of the participating EU countries shrewdly 
recognized the security deficit in Africa as an opportunity to showcase their modernized armed 
forces.
5
 Europe however, was unwilling to commit an effective level of military support to 
intervene in Darfur, with military misfortunes in the Yugoslav Wars as well as Liberia and Sierra 
Leone still fresh in the memories of EU policymakers. Unlike with France in Cote d‟Ivoire, Italy 
in the Ethiopian and Eritrean War, and Belgium in the myriad of Great Lakes region crises, 
Darfur had no major European power with traditional interests in the area to influence greater 
participation from other European Union member states.
6
  With little clarity or coordination 
coming from the United Nations during the early phases of the Darfur conflict, the European 
Union remained militarily stagnant, making its contribution to the crisis strictly humanitarian, 
outside the occasional anti-Sudanese government summit.
7
  
  In 2007, the inactivity and disorganization that had defined the European Union‟s role in 
the Darfur conflict thus far came to an end. The European Community, which now recognized 
the failures of economic and legal prevention in halting of genocides, stepped up its financial and 
advisory support to the African Union.  It also called for the entire international community to 
support unilateral sanctions and strict no-fly zones over Darfur to prevent Sudanese air force 
attacks.  Most importantly, it developed plans to introduce thousands of European Troops to the 
Chad-Darfur border.  These actions suggest a marked change in policy for the EU, which was 
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fully aware of the failures of the DPA as well as the African Union‟s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
and understood that greater involvement from a diplomatic and military perspective from the 
European Union would be required to bring stability to the region. 
 The European Union‟s policy transformation from neutral status in 2004 when European 
nations summarily rejected the idea of military intervention, to 2007 when they became more 
involved in the intervention process with the promoting of no-fly zones and plans of a European 
peacekeeping force in the region, was not without reason.  First, the EU realized that stabilizing 
the catastrophe was beyond the capabilities of the African Union alone, which did not have the 
funding nor the materiel or guidance necessary to efficiently intervene in Darfur.
8
  Likewise, 
even with proposed and promised funding from the international community led by the E.C., the 
European Union recognized that the humanitarian intervention and stabilization of the crisis was 
not the sole responsibility of African nations.  
Second and more importantly, the European Union astutely shifted its policy towards 
Darfur in 2007 because it detected the potential for the region‟s security deficit to spill into the 
surrounding areas, affecting all of East Africa and making the conflict drastically more difficult 
to curtail.  This would have the greatest impact on the E.C. due to its close proximity to Africa 
and, for certain powerful members of the Union who were heavily invested in the continent, such 
as Britain and France, it would have had significant economic ramifications.  These factors show 
that Europe‟s increased involvement in the crisis management process in Darfur during 2007 was 
more correlated to the interests of the European Community in protecting its bilateral activities in 
Africa, along with the protection of the European homeland from refugee influx and increased 
                                                            
 
8 Mamdani, 40. 
61 
 
terrorist activity that would undoubtedly derive from volatility in East Africa, than it was the 
lives of the black African population of Darfur. 
From the outset of the conflict, the European Union along with the international 
community en masse showed little political will for prevention. The Sudanese government did 
not accept the UN‟s demand to restrain Janjawid militia from terrorizing Darfur in 2004 because 
to that point, Sudan recognized no firm consequences from the international community if it 
continued to support the Janjawid.
9
 In August 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell warned 
Sudan to accept UN Resolution 1556 to rein in the militia, yet there was no specified punitive 
action in the resolution if the Sudanese failed to do so.
10
  
As previously shown, the Security Council and therefore the UN were at odds due to 
varying opinions on how to approach Sudan, and the United States was in no position to 
admonish Sudan or back up any punitive action due to its position in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This 
left the European Union, which attempted to coerce the Sudanese government into stabilizing the 
situation in Darfur through economic means. Foreign ministers of the European Commission, 
which is the executive body of the EU and is responsible for the implementation of EU policy, 
began to pressure Sudan through the prospect of economic sanctions and the disruption of the 
Cotonou Agreement for violation.  As a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement, Sudan was 
responsible for the respect of human rights and adherence to democratic principles and the rule 
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 This method of coercion proved to be of little consequence to the Sudanese government 
who continued in late 2004 to integrate Janajwid militia forces into its own military. 
In August 2004, EU investigator Pieter Feith declared, “we are not in the situation of 
Genocide there,”
12
 although he describes the situation in Darfur as grim, with widespread killing 
and the calculated destruction of specific villages rife.  This declaration was soon contended by 
human rights groups who proclaimed that by finding no signs of genocide in Darfur, yet finding 
that specific targeting of a particular ethnic group and their cultural centers is a complete denial 
of the definition of genocide.  The European Union‟s response to this accusation was to allocate 
more funding, twenty million Euros, to the humanitarian aid process bringing the total provided 
by the European Commission by the end of 2004 to one hundred four million Euros.  European 
humanitarian aid was having little impact on the catastrophe however, with the situation quickly 
worsening for aid workers who were contending with a progressively greater number of IDPs 
and an overall lack of safety as a result of harassment from both Janjawid and SPLM forces.   
The strategy of deterring a humanitarian crisis through the use of economic or political 
means ultimately has little success on a state, like Sudan, that is already fully engaged in conflict 
and is not compelled by members of the international community to cease its actions.  Thomas C. 
Schelling, in his work on conflict management through the use of economic, political, or military 
intervention posits that the perpetrator must be compelled to understand the other entity‟s level 
of commitment and intention to resolving the crisis through action, if they are to understand the 
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consequences for not complying with demands.
13
 According to Schelling, to prevent loss of face 
in regard to a perpetrating state not ceasing aggressive action, expectations must be underlined 
and clearly stated so that fear of punitive measures can coerce the perpetrator from continuing 
their actions.
14
 From the beginning of its involvement, the European Union did not adequately 
illustrate to Sudan its level of commitment or the severity of measures if Sudan did not comply 
with EU and UN demands to rein in the Janjawid and cease air raids against Darfuri villages.   
The cautionary and noticeably fearful response of financial support and vocal disdain for 
the Sudanese government‟s actions in Darfur continued for the European Union through 2004 
and into 2005.  EU foreign policy high representative Javier Solana, after a visit to the region in 
October 2004, announced that the EU would pledge one hundred million Euros in support of the 
African Union‟s peacekeeping force in Darfur.  Despite further declarations that the EU would 
also provide enhanced logistical support to AMIS, EU military personnel participating in AMIS 
operations would remain negligible.  After much planning and debate, on July 18, 2005, the 
European Commission established a civilian-military action to support the African Union‟s 
enhanced AMIS mission in Darfur.
15
 The mandate was to make European equipment and 
resources, materiel, and finances available to AMIS.  It also intended to use EU military 
specialists to provide planning and technical assistance to AU commanders, strategic and tactical 
transportation, and training for African troops and observers.
16
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Understanding that military intervention was not a viable option for the European Union, 
considering the United States‟ position in Iraq and the realization that intervention would be 
synonymous with invasion and colonialism to the world‟s developing countries, Solana 
supported the EU-AMIS joint action plan because it best utilized EU funding and crisis 
management capabilities.
17
 However, despite Solana and the EU‟s intention, support for AMIS 
tapered off only a year after the mandate‟s inception.  In spring 2006, while the AU was in the 
crux of its operation in Darfur, soldiers and specialists stopped getting paid, the deliverance of 
EU materiel grounded to a halt, and less than half of the agreed upon twenty-five EU military 
officers intended to support AMIS operations in Darfur had actually been provided.
18
 The 
European Union, as one of high representative Solana‟s aides declared, was losing global 
credibility because of its inabilities to follow through on its promises to the African Union at a 
time when it was most needed.  
By the summer of 2006, the European Community had mobilized approximately one 
billion Euros for the Darfur crisis, most of which was used to provide food, sheltering, and other 
forms of humanitarian assistance to the refugees of Darfur.
19
  Despite its admirable efforts in 
humanitarianism however, the EU to that point had not done enough to halt the cause of the 
                                                            
 
17 Ann Roosevelt, “Intervention Lesson: Better Civil-Military Coordination, Solana Says,” Defense Daily International 
6, no. 42 (October 28, 2005): 1, 
http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/pqdweb?index=129&did=918600711&SrchMode=1&sid=3&Fmt=3&
VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1272294562&clientId=20176 (accessed April 17, 2010). 
18 See Mamdani, 40, for accounts of and reasoning behind the EU suspending the provision of funds to AMIS in 
2006. For an account of the EU not committing the tactical assistance and materiel to AMIS that it had previously 
agreed upon, see David Cronin, “Sudan/EU politics: 'Inability to deliver' puts EU's international reputation at risk,” 
The Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/pqdweb?did=1016469791&sid=
3&Fmt=3&clientId=20176&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed April 17, 2010).    
19 “Sudan: European Union response to the Darfur crisis,” Sudan Watch, 
http://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2006/07/sudan-european-union-response-to.html (accessed April 18, 2010). 
65 
 
humanitarian disaster and bring to justice, as part of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, those 
responsible. The European Commission supported calls for the UN to create an international 
commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations in Darfur, which was created on 
September 18, 2004 after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1564.  Unfortunately, it 
also supported the findings of the commission that the Government of Sudan had not pursued a 
policy of Genocide in Darfur.   
In an effort to break the cycle of impunity, the EU went on to become a primary 
supporter of UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), which allowed the International 
Criminal Court, for the first time since the inception of the Rome Statute in 2002, to investigate 
human rights abuses and crimes against humanity in a sovereign country.
20
 On June 6, 2005, the 
Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, officially opened the investigation.  From 
June 2005 to June 2008, Moreno-Ocampo and his aides yielded seven reports confirming the 
existence of crimes against humanity and human rights abuses in Darfur, and calling for the 
arrest of several high ranking Janjawid militia leaders as well as several members of the 
Government of Sudan.
21
 The European Commission‟s firm support of the ICC investigation 
process in Sudan marked a precedent for the EU concerning its intervention effort in the Darfur 
crisis. For the first time since the acceptance of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, the European 
Union utilized international law, as opposed to political or diplomatic methods, to put pressure 
on a bilateral trade partner in the interest of conflict management.  
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In addition to its use of international law, the EU was an active supporter of the Abuja 
peace talks which led to the signing of the DPA.
22
  Although the DPA, in retrospect, has been 
perceived as a resounding failure for its inability to involve the common Darfuri citizen as well 
as its brokers‟ incapacity to uphold the ceasefire agreement more than a week after its approval, 
the European Union was an instrumental element in its mediation. The EU played a significant 
role in persuading dissident groups to the negotiation table for a better consensus and also helped 
to get monitors on the ground in Darfur through its European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) program.
23
 Financially, the EU continued with its well documented assistance for the 
humanitarian effort and the rebuilding process in Darfur. However, due to the rapid failure of the 
ceasefire which accompanied the DPA, even with the help of additional monitors, aid did not 
reach its intended targets.  Notwithstanding its limited success, the European Union‟s 
comprehensive involvement in the DPA from the beginning of the Abuja peace talks in the 
summer of 2005 to the signing of the Agreement in May 2006 showed a significant increase in 
the amount of diplomatic attention that the European Union was placing on the successful 
mediation of the Darfur crisis. 
 Perhaps the most telling indication of the EU‟s shift in policy regarding the importance of 
the Darfur crisis was the authorization of the European Union Force Chad/CAR (EUFOR 
TCHAD/RCA) on October 15, 2007. A press release summarizing the results of the 2824th 
meeting of the Council of the European Union at which the mission was approved, read: 
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The Council decided that the EU will conduct a bridging military operation in Eastern 
Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) in the 
framework of the European security and defence policy. This follows the adoption of UN 
Security Council resolution 1778 (2007), which approves the deployment in Chad and the 
CAR of a multidimensional presence and authorises the EU to provide the military 
element. By addressing the regional dimension of the Darfur crisis, the deployment of 
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and a UN police mission, in parallel to UNAMID in Sudan, is a 




The decision to commit a military presence to the region evokes two messages concerning the 
EU‟s policy towards the crisis. First, approving operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA confirms the 
political and economic importance of the region to the EU, particularly France and Belgium, 
with the language clearly stating that by placing Chad and the Central African Republic within 
the framework of the Darfur crisis, the EU would be able to better facilitate a peace process in 
Darfur and stabilize the entire region which had been further destabilized by the introduction of 
over three hundred thousand Darfuri refugees.  In essence, the European Commission in Africa 
recognized that the spread of violent conflict in Western Sudan into the already erratic conditions 
of surrounding countries could create an unsolvable security disaster in the region. Second, it 
showed that the European Union accepted the limitations of linking good governance and human 
rights to favorable trade rights or economic and infrastructural development. The operation was 
also necessary to prevent highly probable war between Chad and Sudan due to the cross-border 
raids of Janjawid militia and Chad‟s noted support of Darfuri rebel groups according to Javier 
Solana, who was a main proponent of the ESDP mission.
25
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 Operating within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy, EUFOR 
TCHAD was intended to supplement UNAMID in its peacekeeping operations within Western 
Darfur by conducting missions aimed at stabilizing the border regions of Chad and the Central 
African Republic until the UN could firmly expand its operation to take over the peacekeeping 
process in the region in its entirety- The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic 
and Chad (MINURCAT).  As a result of efforts by the Sudanese government to stifle UN 
attempts at making a coherent and effective move to deploy a fully operational UNAMID force 
to Darfur throughout the planning and development phase of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, the EU‟s 
task became much more difficult.
26
 Chadian civil strife was also having a similar suffocating 
effect on EUFOR TCHAD/RCA as armed conflicts between rebel groups and forces loyal to 
Chad President Idriss Deby, particularly the rebel assault on the Chadian capital N‟djamena, 
made it difficult for EUFOR TCHAD/RCA to focus on Darfur.
27
 Nonetheless, the EU mission 
deployed as a bridging operation instead of supplementary, intending to hand over all 
peacekeeping operations in the region to the UN in twelve months under MINURCAT. 
 EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, which did not deploy until February 2008, was not without its 
critics. Amongst member states of the EU, Germany and Great Britain did not commit soldiers to 
the intended four thousand troop operation because of the overwhelming control of the process 
held by France, who they felt did not take adequate account of the opinions of other large EU 
members in the planning phase of the mission.  The delayed start of the operation was also 
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another cause for concern. Amid renewed and escalating violence in Darfur in February 2008, 
which saw the influx of thousands more refugees daily, calls to deploy EUFOR TCHAD/RCA 
with haste fell on deaf ears as the mission would not reach operational capability until mid 
March according to Javier Solana.
28
 The non-deployment of UNAMID, coupled with the delayed 
deployment of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA proved to be a disastrous combination for Darfuri IDPs.  
Logistically, there were several major concerns for the viability of EUFOR TCHAD.  A full year 
after its authorization, there were only thirty-three hundred troops in the field.
29
 The expansive 
geographic area of Eastern Chad and the Republic of Central Africa, as well as the entirety of the 
border of Western Darfur, was too great for thirty-three hundred peacekeeping troops to 
sufficiently cover. The arid, desert-like environment of East Africa also placed a significant 
burden on EU troops and equipment. The need for airborne mobility was crucial because of the 
region‟s jagged terrain, yet EU member states were reluctant to incur the expense of donating 
helicopters to ease the obvious deficiency.
30
 
 Despite the glaring flaws in EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, and the fact that its performance 
was marginal at best, its approval and deployment by the European Commission showed intent 
from the European Community to take necessary steps to contain and eventually resolve the 
conflict in Darfur. The problems faced by UNAMID in reference to political will and materiel 
significantly strained EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, yet they were able to persist by changing their 
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mandate to become less an appendage of the faltering UN mission, and more the primary source 
of peacekeepers.  A weakened and fractured Chad under the despotism of President Deby made 
security conditions more volatile in the region. Nonetheless EUFOR TCHAD/RCA found some 
success in reducing the danger to Darfuri refugees and providing them safe access to drinking 
water and food from humanitarian aid sources.
31
  Although they could not deal with the source of 
the conflict directly, the EU force put considerable pressure on Khartoum, who was forced to 
reflect on the probability and feasibility of a humanitarian invasion if it did not heed calls from 
the international community to find a lasting resolution for the embattled region.  
The disorganized and strictly humanitarian response from the European Community 
concerning the Darfur conflict at its outset in early 2003 was disconcerting.  With the exception 
of the major European powers that had colonial ties to the region, most European countries 
individually had little interest in the crisis, only hoping to keep its residual effects, specifically 
refugees, out of Europe. Collectively in the form of the European Union, the European 
Community threatened economic sanctions, condemned Khartoum for its role in the genocidal 
rampage, and gave half-hearted financial support to AMIS.  Recognizing the financial and 
security ramifications for Europe of several failed states in East Africa, the EU began to 
transform its policy towards the Darfur crisis, taking a more active role in the facilitation of its 
peaceful resolution.  This activity began with the European Commission‟s strong support of ICC 
investigations in Darfur, and culminated with the deployment of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA through 
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ESDP, which was at its operational peak in the summer of 2008. Partially motivated by self-
interests, the European Union transformed its Darfur policy from apathetic observer in 2003 to 




CHAPTER FOUR: THE AFRICAN UNION- AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK ON A 
SHOESTRING BUDGET 
 
The inability of the United States, United Nations, and European Union to effectively 
resolve the crisis in Darfur had a direct effect on the African Union‟s actions in the region, as 
well as its recognition as a potent global entity.  The pattern of intentional negligence, aggressive 
rhetoric, and desultory action that characterized the US, UN, and EU‟s relationship with the 
Darfur crisis was also an affliction of the African Union, although it had significantly less control 
over its activities when compared with the other three organizations.  As a result of its youth, 
having only been in existence less than one year when SPLA and JEM forces attacked Sudanese 
forces in al-Fashir, the African Union was virtually completely reliant on foreign financial and 
materiel contributions.  In theory, western states were eager to finance the African Union‟s 
peacekeeping operations in Darfur if it kept troops from those nations away from the conflict.  
Likewise, the African Union was keen to accept the funding as it was viewed as an opportunity 
to further its development and capabilities after its transformation from the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU).  Darfur presented the African Union with an opportunity to greatly 
progress its operational capabilities while simultaneously asserting its global legitimacy. 
In actuality, intervention in the Darfur crisis was a resounding failure for the African 
Union.  Despite the numerous promises and grand plans presented by the African Union and the 
global community that supported them, the African Union‟s Mission in Sudan had very little 
effect on the ground due to a host of reasons, notably underfunding and a severe lack of logistics. 
A lack of political will was also a major hindrance.  AU officials on a fact-finding mission to 
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Darfur in July 2004 determined in their conclusions, in the face of great slaughter caused by the 
government-backed Janjawid militia, that a policy of ethnic cleansing had not been adopted in 
Darfur.
1
 The same officials, led by Commission chairman Alpha Konare, were overt in their 
efforts not to alienate a Khartoum that still had the backing of the AU‟s Arab states, which would 
have had a potentially detrimental impact on the organization.  Although the African Union may 
have had the infrastructural and military potential necessary to successfully intervene in Darfur 
with financial assistance from the international community, political discord and a lack of 
general direction, an unfortunate regularity in its short history, beset the organization in its 
efforts in Darfur.       
The inherent limitations of the AMIS mandate are also a focus for critics of the African 
Union‟s insufficient intervention effort. AMIS was meant to uphold the ceasefire which was 
established during the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA), spearheaded by Konare in 
April 2004.
2
 The Government of Sudan, JEM, and SPLM agreed to cease hostilities and allow 
for the facilitation of humanitarian assistance.  The groups also agreed to allow a team of 
military observers and their accompanying protection forces to overlook the ceasefire, under 
which AMIS was born and hopes for a later comprehensive peace agreement were conceived.
3
 
The AMIS mandate was thus formed under the pretense that a stable ceasefire would actually be 
upheld between the various groups involved, without any strong coercion from external actors or 
a firm understanding of what the HCFA entailed.  What resulted was an immediate disintegration 
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of the ceasefire which put the civilian population back on knife‟s edge while AU military 
personnel could only observe.  Critics of AMIS, who contend that the African Union‟s primary 
objectives in Darfur should have been to stabilize the security deficit to ensure it would not 
spread into neighboring countries and to protect the population from gross violations of human 
rights, claim that the mandate was too strict in its interpretation and completely reactive.
4
 The 
unsuccessful Abuja Peace Talks and subsequent DPA of which the African Union put significant 
time and resources, understandably failed as a result of the failures of HCFA and AMIS.   
 In addition to insufficient funding and support from the global community and a weak 
AMIS mandate, the African Union‟s intervention effort in Darfur was also debilitated by poor 
planning.  At the beginning of the operation, AMIS consisted of a protection force of only 300 
soldiers from Nigeria and Rwanda; AU officials quickly realized that a force of this size would 
not be enough to uphold HCFA agreements.
5
 Therefore an expansion operation, called AMIS II, 
was initiated.  The AMIS II protection force of 1,695 African troops and 450 military observers 
that operated in Darfur in April 2005 was 1,800 less than what the AU had hoped for by that time 
and monitored an area approximately 250,000 square kilometers in size that was populated by 
over six million people.
6
  According to Catherine Guicherd of the International Peace Academy, 
AMIS and AMIS II staff, “whether military, police or civilian, were given minimal guidance; 
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and strategic level goals were not clearly articulated.”
7
 Unorganized, misguided and poorly 
equipped, AMIS protection forces only worsened the humanitarian crisis in the region, as IDPs 
falsely believed AU troops would safeguard them from Janjawid militia attacks, who instead 
only watched in numerous occasions as Darfuri refugees were killed outside of IDP camps.  
After releasing a company of African Union troops that he captured in western Darfur in October 
2005, the military leader of the JEM, Mohamed Salah told Reuters News Service, "The AU have 
become part of the conflict. We want the AU to leave and we have warned them not to travel to 




 AMIS continued to expand its presence and operation in Sudan with little success 
throughout 2005 and 2006, its forces reaching seven thousand at its operational peak. The AU 
had hoped to increase the force by an additional three thousand but did not have the resources or 
capabilities to do so.  Despite opposition from the Sudanese government, the AMIS mandate 
eventually dissolved and with the operation on the precipice of collapse, AMIS merged into 
UNAMID on December 31, 2007 after the July 2007 approval of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1769.  The African Union had thus succeeded in showing the international 
community that it was capable of responding to African security crises garnering the young 
organization much needed global “credibility.”   
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In truth, African ownership of African problems was shown to be hyperbole.  The 
African Union was heavily dependent on Western “partnership;” when promised resources and 
manpower from the West dried out as a result of political posturing and financial constraints, the 
poor training and tactics of the African Union were exposed.  Equal support from AU member 
states was also severely lacking. Similar to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), where South 
Africa and Ethiopia provided seventy-five percent of the total security force in Burundi, Nigeria 
and Rwanda provided the majority of the mission‟s troop support, while other member states 
contributions were minimal.
9
 Regardless of the presence of African troops or their quantity, their 
ineffective mandate made them mere spectators of the humanitarian catastrophe.  In essence, the 
strategic and operational adversity experienced by the African Union in Darfur was offset by the 
fact that the organization could claim a victory internationally because it took responsibility for 
the continent‟s security architecture.
10
 Plainly summed up by Gerard Prunier, “it (AU) was also 
satisfied: it had been allowed to play in the big boys‟ league and would not have to pay for the 
privilege. “Africa” would be at the forefront of the Darfur crisis and any accusations of 
impotence or limitation of means could be beamed back at the donors.”
11
     
As previously noted, the African Union‟s participation in the Darfur peace process was 
almost totally financed by the global community, with most of the perspective funding coming 
from Brussels and Washington.  Verbal support for the African Union‟s peacekeeping mission in 
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Darfur came from nearly every major international organization.  Pledged money, materiel, and 
military experts from a number of world leaders gave AU officials confidence that the African 
Union would be able to adequately respond to the security crisis that was threatening to spill out 
of Darfur.  Only two months after the inception of AMIS, in October 2004, US Congressman 
Gregory W. Meeks petitioned Congress for a $150 million to help expand the operation.  
Explaining the reasons behind such a lofty request, Meeks stated, "The most critical thing we can 
do is protect the Darfur refugees and put an adequate contingent of peacekeeping forces in place 
to prevent further acts of genocide by rebel and Sudanese government forces."
12
  
On October 21, 2004, on the back of the African Union Peace and Security Council‟s 
formal agreement to send thirty-two hundred African peacekeepers to Darfur, President Bush 
ordered the Defense Department to send two C-130 military transport planes to Africa to 
transport African troops into Darfur along with the promise to be amongst many Western states 
that aimed to provide more than $200 million in logistical support to AMIS.
13
  The US was not 
alone in its declarations of assistance to the mission, as both Javier Solana and Kofi Annan 
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By early 2005, it became clear that funding and support from the international 
community for AMIS would not arrive with the same confidence and assurance that it was 
previously promised.  The African Union guaranteed the manpower necessary to bring a halt to 
the crisis, yet Western powers that were initially eager to train, pay and equip African troops as it 
kept Western forces out of the region, did not follow through on their guarantees of financing.  
By March 2005, only $25 million of the $500 million pledged five months prior had been 
received.
15
  Some scholars point to political motives as the reasoning behind Western states 
deferring the providing of funds. According to Mahmood Mamdani, Western powers were eager 
to make the African Union a scapegoat for the lack of coordination between organizations and 
the subsequent stagnation on the ground; by doing so, it would justify the necessity for the UN to 
replace the AU in terms of both actual leadership and perceptibility to global media and NGOs.  
In Saviors and Survivors, Mamdani asserts, “It seems fair to conclude that a coordinated effort 
was under way to discredit the African Union‟s presence so as to clear the way for “blue-hatting” 
African soldiers- literally replacing African Union hats with blue UN hats.”
16
 The author goes on 
to claim that the United Nations and other international organizations were hesitant in backing 
the African Union as they had once intended because the AU, unlike the rest of the world, did 
not believe as an organization that what was taking place in Darfur at the time was tantamount to 
state-sponsored genocide or crimes against humanity.
17
 In a period when most of the global 
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community was pressuring the United Nations to sponsor external military intervention in the 
region, the AU‟s philosophy according to Mamdani, was not popular. 
Mamdani‟s view, while not a primary argument of the book, subconsciously questions 
the role of race in the motives of Western states that severely handicapped AMIS by withholding 
pledged funding and materiel.  Similarly, Michael L. Krenn‟s The Color of Empire: Race and 
American Foreign Relations alludes to the notion that the foreign policy of the United States and 
other predominately white countries towards non-white nations or entities like the African Union 
is embedded in racist ideology. Krenn argues that the historical domination of the world by 
whites during the age of exploration and the colonial period, as well as the self-perceived 
superiority of whites in leadership and governance begets de facto underlying racism in the 
current realm of international politics.
18
  
Although external factors such as lessening financial support from the international 
community and political contradictions possibly based on racism were critical aspects that added 
to the deficiencies of AMIS, the African Union itself played a major role and was ultimately 
responsible for the mission‟s failure.  One such failure was the inability of the African Union to 
hold its largest member state (by size), Sudan, responsible for its gross misconduct as a 
sovereign and modern nation, in the treat of its citizens. Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
notwithstanding, Sudan was expected to follow standards set by the governing mandate of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights which is backed by the African Court of 
Justice.  The Government of Sudan did not respect the Commission‟s mandate, yet African 
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Union leaders were reluctant to hold Sudanese officials responsible.  Initiatives such as Chadian 
President Idriss Deby‟s Abeche Agreement and the AU‟s Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement 
were unsuccessful and somewhat self-serving; they also did not question the Sudanese 
government‟s role in perpetuating the crisis.  In an effort to keep the Darfur crisis a domestic 
issue of an AU member state, thereby appeasing Khartoum and other Arab member states, AU 
officials such as Alpha Konare and AU Chairman Olusegun Obasanjo refused to confront 
Khartoum and pinpoint its leaders as the main perpetrators of the massacres. 
The AMIS mandate is another point of contention when determining the African Union‟s 
level of liability.  Discussing the importance of a mandate to the success of a peacekeeping 
operation, Arvid Ekengard states, “As the legal basis for military actions, the mandate is the 
natural benchmark to judge any peace operation against. Weak, unrealistic mandates have 
plagued peace operations since the birth of the concept.”
19
  If the success of a mission lies within 
the strength and basis of its mandate, then it is easy to perceive why AMIS was unsuccessful.  
Based on the HCFA, the AMIS mandate in its original and modified form, set out to “monitor 
compliance with the HCFA, to assist in the process of confidence building, and to contribute to a 
secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the return of IDP‟s and 
refugees.”
20
  In the mandate‟s development, it is apparent that AU policymakers made several 
assumptions pertaining to the conditions in which AMIS would operate.   
One such assumption was that the ceasefire agreement would be actively upheld by 
warring parties, that hostile acts would be avoided, and that the Sudanese government would 
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attempt to disarm the Janjawid and other government-controlled militia.
21
 Although Sudan had 
committed to upholding the ceasefire and disarming the militia groups, militia forces continued 
to operate without restraint in the region and in some cases, were still actively supported by the 
government.
22
   
Another assumption within the mandate relates to the operation‟s military capabilities. 
The amended AMIS task list called for officers and troops to “be prepared to protect both static 
and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within 
capabilities,” and to “provide a visible military presence by patrolling and establishing temporary 
outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the 
population.”
23
 As a result of severe underfunding, there was a major disparity between what the 
mandate demanded and what the military forces of AMIS were actually capable of. These 
factors, according to Ekengard caused some confusion over responsibility of the ineffectiveness 
of AMIS and the subsequent continuation of the humanitarian disaster.
24
  
During the latter half of 2005 and all of 2006 the African Union‟s precarious situation in 
Darfur continued to decline.  HCFA failed, government attacks in Darfur worsened, and the 
African Union capacity to respond deteriorated even with the transformation of the mandate due 
to a lack of direction and monetary support.  In October 2005, the AU accused the Sudanese 
government of painting their military vehicles in African Union colors and attacking villages in 
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Darfur, killing nearly fifty and displacing thousands in a two week span.
25
 Simultaneously, AU 
forces were being targeted and attacked by rebel forces in Darfur with more regularity for their 
perceived role as a fighting force in the conflict.
26
 The situation was worsening for the African 
Union.  As it became clear to the organization that the international community grew 
disenfranchised with the idea of funding AMIS without noticeable strides in the improvement of 
the crisis, the AU succumbed to pressure from Western states to hand ownership and 
responsibility of the intervention operation over to the United Nations.  
Over the next year, the transition from AMIS to UNAMID was especially turbulent for 
the African Union. The adept shifting of Khartoum on their stance towards a non-African 
peacekeeping force in Sudan kept UNAMID from being established, which further stretched the 
already threadbare AU operation that had to maintain a presence in the region until it could be 
replaced by its UN counterpart.
27
  In the winter months of 2006, the UN and AU agreed upon a 
three-phased transformation that would see responsibility for the peace operation transferred to 
the United Nations; Khartoum approved the plan.
28
  
The first phase saw the African Union receive a „Light Support Package‟ from the UN 
made up of advisers and equipment to support the intelligence and observation capabilities of 
AMIS in preparation for the transformation.  The second phase, called the „Heavy Support 
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Package,‟ was meant to heavily reinforce the military capacity of AMIS with the addition of 
nearly four thousand military personnel sponsored by the UN; the four thousand would gradually 
increase to twenty thousand.  The third phase was intended to be the formal transformation from 
AMIS to UNAMID.  Sudanese support for the plan diminished soon after the transformation 
process began to take its first steps.  Citing fear that foreign (Western) forces under the United 
Nations intervening in Darfur would be more like a neo-imperialistic invasion, Khartoum 
objected to the inclusion of Western troops in the peacekeeping forces that would operate in 
Darfur.
29
 The Sudanese government stood firm in this declaration because it enjoyed the backing 
of several of the Islamic world‟s militant factions, with al-Qaeda stating in 2007 that any UN 
troops entering the fully Islamic realm of Darfur would be repelled at all costs.
30
 
The hybrid AU-UN transformation effort was not only stifled and delayed by Khartoum, 
but also by influential circles within the African Union who feared their international credibility 
would be compromised if, like Mamdani states, AU helmets are replaced with UN helmets on 
African soldiers.  Apprehension amongst African leaders, possibly influenced by Khartoum, that 
AU troops would do the dirty work while led by UN officials in a paternalistic relationship, may 
have also played a role in the delayed transition.
31
  With nations threatening to pull out forces as 
a result of deadly attacks on its troops, as well as an impending financial and structural collapse 
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of AMIS, the UN was able to circumvent Khartoum‟s obstruction policy to transfer authority of 





Over the first half of 2008, the United Nations-led operation made some progress in 
Darfur, gaining access and securing previous “no-go” areas so that humanitarian assistance could 
reach IDPs still trapped in the area.
33
 However, in terms of making a verifiable difference, 
UNAMID faced the same issues as AMIS over the two years prior; poor equipment, severe 
underfunding, a mandate that bent to the demands of Khartoum, and unrealistically high goals all 
plagued the operation.
34
 In this, the African Union could claim some form of victory which could 
be used as a satisfactory excuse for its poor conflict management performance in Sudan.  The 
United Nations was also failing to do what the international community proclaimed the African 
Union could not; stabilize the region and resolve the conflict allowing humanitarian aid to reach 
its intended targets.   
Ultimately, despite the mandate transformation, from one that drew criticisms for its 
weakness to one that included the protection of IDPs and refugee camps, very few of the African 
Union‟s goals in the region were realized because it did not have the support it was promised. 
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Though not nearly as satisfying as to the organization as achieving the primary goal of 
successfully showcasing its conflict management capabilities, this victory pleased the African 
Union nonetheless because the international community was shown, through the similar plight of 
UNAMID, to collectively abandon the Darfur crisis at the time when action and implementation, 






 Collectively, the international community failed to adequately intervene in the Darfur 
genocide and the subsequent security deficit in the entire region, allowing the conflict to 
continue and worsen with no foreseeable end to date.  A faster, more precise, and better 
coordinated effort from the international community during the formative months of the crisis in 
2003 and early 2004 would have had a much greater effect on the intervention process than the 
respective policies pursued by the world‟s leading nations and organizations that followed.  
These policies, which should have been the physical emulation of strong rhetoric from global 
leaders that condemned the Government of Sudan and threatened action if the Sudanese 
government did not comply with demands to stop sponsoring attacks on the population of 
Darfur, instead reflected the global interests and national goals of each. 
Global economic frailties which characterized the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
as well as many international conflicts such as the global War on Terror and the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars, which occurred concurrently with the Darfur crisis, certainly hindered the 
ability of some states to take an active role in the resolution process.  However, the geopolitical 
interests of most nations involved and the economic and diplomatic importance of Sudan as the 
largest country in the Islamic world are factors that had an equal or greater impact.  These 
factors, as shown, made a unified and concerted response to the Darfur question both difficult to 
achieve, as the individuality of states and organizations made disagreements such as those 
between the United States and the United Union frequent, and dangerous to pursue as any action 
by Western states in Sudan could ignite a major international conflict with an Islamic world that 
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was already uneasy as a result of the aforementioned wars that targeted sovereign Islamic 
countries and extremist organizations. 
Thus, the international community proceeded to further complicate the Darfur question.  
Beginning with Secretary of State Colin Powell‟s assertion of genocide on September 9, 2004, 
the global response to Darfur, with the aid of the media and human rights groups, turned the 
distant African crisis into a major political question in which the UN, the US, and other global 
leaders were required to provide an answer.  At a period when many Western countries had 
hoped to keep the Darfur conflict out of national consciousness, it was thrust upon them by the 
international media.  The introduction of the fledgling African Union into the realm of global 
political leadership, which was originally seen by Western states as a benefit, complicated the 
issue greater because of its lack of organization, political will, and finance.  Not only did the 
international community‟s aim of providing “African solutions to African problems” fail within 
the first two years of the crisis because it did not supply the support it promised, but it was also 
contradictory to the collective international “never again” pledge to be proactive in halting 
crimes against humanity after the events in Rwanda.
1
 
   Throughout the transformation process of the international community‟s response to the 
Darfur crisis, it has become clear that despite the introduction of preventative measures such 
United Nations Genocide Resolution 260 and the United Nations General Assembly recognized 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the international community has yet to develop a conflict 
                                                            
 
1 Prunier, 124; Don Cheadle and John Pendergrast, “'Never again'- again,” USA Today, March 1, 2005. 
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management system to comprehensibly respond to and neutralize genocides or crimes against 
humanity.  In classically accepted cases of genocide since the advent of Resolution 260, Bosnia 
and Rwanda, the international community was also reactive.   
In Bosnia, similar to Darfur, debates over the proclamation of the term genocide slowed 
the international response as critics of its use argued that proponents were declaring genocide as 
part of a political process intended to evoke images related to the archetypal genocide, the Jewish 
Holocaust.  Its proponents hoped the use of imagery related to the Jewish Holocaust would incite 
the international community to mobilize against the conflict‟s perpetrators, the Serbs, effectively 
ending the conflict.
2
 The international community‟s presence, regardless of the lack of evidence 
in advance, was long overdue in Bosnia. According to Resolution 260, the goal of the 
international community is to prevent potential genocides from occurring.  Through the media 
and other sources of information, it was clear to the international community that the Muslim 
population of Bosnia was being targeted by the State, yet no international force intervened in 
Srebrenica until 1993 with the inception of failed peacekeeping mission UNPROFOR, a death-
filled year after the conflict began. Much like in Darfur, this international response was 
undermanned and directed by an insufficient mandate.  Only the signing of the Dayton Accord in 
1995, which established an outline for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought an end to the 
crisis- with the help of sixty thousand NATO ground troops.
3
    
                                                            
 
2 Robert M. Hayden, “Mass Killings and Images of Genocide in Bosnia, 1941-5 and 1992-5,” in The Historiography of 
Genocide, ed. Dan Stone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 508. 
3 Richard Caplan, "Assessing the Dayton Accord: The Structural Weaknesses of the General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Diplomacy & Statecraft 11, no. 2 (July 2000): 213, Military & Government 
Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed May 25, 2010). 
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The Rwandan genocide proved to be a major and lasting blemish to the advocates of 
international interventionalism.  Similar to Darfur, despite the early signs of potential genocide 
such as a series of small-scale massacres that took place before the events of April 1994, the 
international community was reluctant to brand the brutality in Rwanda a genocide, which would 
have required them to take action.
4
 According to Scott Straus, the hasty US declaration of 
genocide in Darfur may have been a consequence of the international community‟s failure to do 
so in Rwanda ten years earlier, although the outcome of both crises were much the same.
5
  Most 
disturbing is that unlike Darfur, the UN had a peacekeeping force in place when the genocide 
began, yet the force did not have the capabilities to compel peace. Scholars of the Rwandan 
genocide typically argue that despite being hampered by poor intelligence, logistics, and several 
other discrepancies, the peacekeeping force could have been reinforced with the necessary 
upgrades to curtail the low-tech violence that caused most of the killings.
6
 Instead of a delayed 
reaction or weak mandates, which were the primary errors in the global response to genocide in 
Bosnia and Darfur, the Rwandan failure is defined by an international community that was 
dismayed by the idea of losing anymore lives in a remote African conflict.  
As noted, the global response to Darfur was untimely, with the first United Nations 
observer teams reporting the possibility of mass murder in spring 2004 although the conflict had 
been ongoing since early 2003.  The international response then progressed from negligence in 
2003 and 2004, to observance in 2004 and 2005, to the use of international law as a deterrent in 
                                                            
 
4 Scott Straus, “The Historiography of the Rwandan Genocide,” in The Historiography of Genocide, ed. Dan Stone 





2006, to which some nations objected.  It progressed further in 2006 with the incoherent use of 
military peacekeeping operations in the region that were ill-equipped and undermanned.  Most 
importantly, the operations were directed by mandates that were dictated by a Sudanese regime 
that should have been held responsible by the international community.  The global response has 
consequently stagnated and the Darfur crisis continues to this day.  Having fallen outside the 
scope of the media and subsequently the grasp of Western public opinion, the Darfur question 
remains unanswered and its perpetrators, who remain at-large as leaders of Sudan, have not 
answered for their crimes.  And thus Darfur has become, to the satisfaction of some, “another 
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